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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to facilitate informed decision making for an optimal allocation 
of future electricity generation resources in South Africa. Such a study is important in 
order to find out which technologies are economically favorable from a long-term 
perspective for a growing and emission-intensive emerging economy that bases its energy 
production predominantly on the depletion of its domestic fossil coal resources. The 
research approach adopted in this dissertation is based on a profound review of literature 
on South Africa’s electricity market, coupled with the development of a full-cost approach 
based on levelized cost of electricity. This approach is used to empirically evaluate the 
performance of new-build technologies including coal, nuclear, natural gas, solar PV, 
CSP and wind with regard to economic, environmental and social criteria. The findings 
from this research provide evidence that coal power stations are not the optimal option for 
electricity generation in South Africa and that wind, CSP, PV and nuclear are to be 
preferred for new investments. The main conclusion drawn from this study is that the 
inclusion of indirect costs and non-monetary aspects of electricity generation makes 
technologies competitive in South Africa that seem expensive from a pure-economic point 
of view. The dissertation recommends that the structure of the South African electricity 
market should be improved to facilitate the accommodation of higher shares of renewable 
energy.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
According to Griffin (2009), a smart energy policy must fulfill three main goals: “energy 
should be cheap, clean and secure”. For most developing and emerging economies this is 
an ambitious target, and normally they cannot satisfy all three requirements at the same 
time. Their first priority is access to cheap energy, followed by securing the availability of 
energy supplies. The third goal of a smart energy policy, the provision of clean energy, 
becomes only relevant after the two other objectives have been satisfied.  
This kind of situation can be observed in South Africa, a country which Okonjo-Iweala 
(2012) counted as one of the most progressive emerging economies in the world. South 
Africa is very rich in fossil energy resources, namely coal, and in consequence has built up 
an infrastructure to harness the energy contained in their domestic resource stock. In fact, 
there is no other major economy that uses coal as extensively as South Africa in its energy 
mix. As Burnard and Bhattacharya (2011) attested, the share of coal in electricity 
generation reached an unparalleled 93% in 2011 and coal was responsible for almost 70% 
of total South African primary energy supply. This might not be surprising given that 
South African coal export prices range amongst the cheapest in the world (IEA, 2012b).  
South Africa is one the most sophisticated economies in Africa. As Griffin (2009) pointed 
out, the more affluent a society becomes, the more importance will be given to clean 
energy supply and to energy security issues. Despite the fact that competitive industries 
such as mining, automotive, agriculture, food processing, manufacturing and a flourishing 
service sector have developed in South Africa, both energy security and clean energy 
supply still represent a big hurdle for the country. External effects from air pollution, use 
of scarce water resources and CO2 emissions from the extensive burning of hydrocarbons 
are a tremendous issue, especially in the Mpumalanga region, where coal power plants 
with a capacity of 30 GW are installed (Eskom, 2012a).  
In addition to environmental degradation, energy supply issues are problems that can be 
observed regularly. Power outages happen frequently throughout the country at times of 
peak demand and both generation and transmission systems are almost constantly under 
their maximum stress (Eskom, 2012c, McGreal, 2008). The given power system is not yet 
managed sustainably and the infrastructure continues to wear out as maintenance times are 
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reduced in order to keep the lights on. To manage peak demand and the burden on the 
system, Eskom (2013h), the national and monopolistic energy supplier in South Africa, 
provides the end customer with live system alerts. The actual stress on transmission and 
regional distribution grids is published and advices which devices should be turned off in 
order to avoid a bigger system collapses are given to the public. 
The South African government has recognized the need for a cleaner and more reliable 
energy system for its society and economy. In 2003, the Department of Minerals and 
Energy (DME), predecessor of today’s Department of Energy (DoE), has created a road-
map for future energy planning. This road-map was called the Integrated Energy Plan 
(IEP). It constitutes South Africa’s principal policy documents for energy planning. The 
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) is embedded in the IEP and takes care of electricity 
generation and transmission capacity planning. It is constantly reviewed, latest in 2010, 
according to new technological and cost developments. The following statement from the 
DoE (2012a) depicts the governments’ point of view on energy politics in a nutshell:   
“Energy is one of the key elements in production processes. A lack or shortage of energy 
has a serious effect on the economy and gross domestic growth. By virtue of its size and 
economic importance, the energy sector periodically requires considerable investments in 
new and replacement supply capacity. Historically, such decisions were primarily driven 
by concerns regarding maintaining supply security, without giving full consideration to the 
economic, environmental and social impacts of all alternatives. As a consequence, the 
tendency has been towards the construction of large-scale capital-intensive supply 
facilities and the neglect of alternatives that might have been more cost effective in the 
long term, and had greater employment benefits and more favourable environmental 
impacts.” 
It seems as if the government actually favors a process of planning and renewing the 
energy sector with a stronger focus on long-term benefits. The potential role of alternative 
energy sources is recognized, and also the need to consider environmental and social 
impacts from the energy system.  
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1.2 Research Focus 
As demonstrated in the background chapter, South Africa’s DoE focused mainly on cheap 
energy supply in the past, followed by concerns about energy security, but without caring 
much about clean energy at all. Coal, the main resource for electricity generation in South 
Africa, is mainly a cheap fossil fuel but it also comes with considerable drawbacks: 
greenhouse gas (GHG) and particulates emissions and quality issues with mined coal make 
this source of energy a dirty and less secure one. Clearly, as long as these aspects are not 
taken into account in an economic evaluation of the technology, coal fires a trade-off 
between the three goals of a smart energy policy.  
Obviously, the government is aware of this and has recognized the need for a more 
sustainable energy pathway. A major contribution to move towards the goals of clean 
energy and energy security is expected to come from renewable energy sources (RES). 
Although this transformation has been planned for more than one decade, the government 
has not yet managed to remove persisting obstacles to the deployment of RES. Some of 
these barriers will be outlined subsequently.  
One such example that illustrates the challenge with increasing the share of RES is the 
government’s target to deploy a fixed quantity of RES by 2013. In the White Paper on 
Renewable Energies (WPRE), the government committed itself in 2003 to an additional 
yearly primary energy supply of 10,000 GWh in 2013 (which equals about 0,6 % of South 
Africa’s primary energy consumption in 2010) to be produced from new installed RES 
(Shabangu, 2003). Now, in 2013, there is little information that this target has been reached 
and an official monitoring and evaluation program from the DoE is not accessible. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to argue that a major discrepancy exists between what has been 
planned and what has been realized.  
Yet the reasons for this discrepancy are not fully evident and might be diverging. Authors 
like Sebitosi & Pillay (2008a) have pointed out that especially “high capital costs, though 
declining rapidly, have been a significant barrier against the deployment of renewable 
energies.” Other authors such as Krupa & Burch (2011) adduced that mainly poor policy 
documents lacking concrete and workable targets, together with slow innovation and 
sustainability entrepreneurship represent one major flaw to the development of RES. They 
also added that corruption, graft and a general lack of transparency in South African 
politics and businesses jeopardize a systematic change. Furthermore, the obstructive 
4 
 
development of market conditions is blamed by authors such as Pegels (2010) as one major 
reason that impeded investments into RES. A highly monopolized market structure, 
regulations that have been changed a couple of times such as the Renewable Energy Feed-
In Tariff (REFIT), or the abortive restructuring of the electricity distribution industry into 
Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs), are perfect examples that may be able to explain, 
why the investment climate for renewable energy projects was not very favorable.  
Another reason for the slow deployment of RES is the low prices for electricity in South 
Africa, which are kept low artificially. Although real prices increased by a factor of 2.3 
since 2003, the current level of prices still prevents alternative technologies from entering 
the market. Amusa (2009) pointed out that on an aggregate level, electricity demand is 
rather insensitive to price changes in South Africa. Prices which reflect the true cost of 
electricity provision would be possible from this point of view. Amusa (2009) argues, that 
resource allocation and efficiency could then be boosted. But he also acknowledges that 
this was especially difficult in South Africa, where a high percentage of the population 
lives below the poverty line. To these people, electricity price increases would be a major 
threat to get access to energy. Another impediment which was mentioned by Yelland 
(2012) is that discrepancies about the calculation of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) 
for current and future electricity generation technologies exist.  
These examples highlighted some of the major barriers to investments into renewable 
energy projects. The electricity industry in South Africa is not yet a level playing field for 
all generation technologies. One should also bear in mind that commitments into new fossil 
power stations are sunk investments for decades to come. This will have a severe impact 
on South Africa’s CO2 future emission trajectories.  
The rationale behind this research is to verify, whether RES are cost-effective in a smart 
energy policy of an emerging economy.  
Therefore, the major focus of this thesis is to concentrate on the three goals of a smart 
energy policy for South Africa. This implies an integrated and comprehensive analysis 
looking at South Africa’s electricity sector from an economic, social and environmental 
perspective. The research focuses on full-cost calculations for all technologies that are 
considered to be relevant for South Africa’s future energy supply. These include coal, 
nuclear, natural gas, concentrating solar power, photovoltaic and wind. 
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Such a multi-dimensional approach intends to make different technology options 
comparable between each other. Investment decisions makers are enabled to broader their 
views, because traditional models of costing energy generation so far seem to favor only 
the use of fossil energy, as Sebitosi & Pillay (2008a) acquiesced. An approach that 
considers the true economic costs of electricity does not exist or is communicated for 
South Africa. Thus, research in this area is necessary and justified. This was also requested 
by Worthington (2012, in (Fakir, 2012):  
“We need a transparent decision making process informed by consideration of the full 
range of costs and benefits to society as a whole and comparative analysis of the 
economic, social and environmental merits of competing investment options and energy 
development pathways.”  
From this statement, the overall research aim of this thesis can be derived. 
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1.3 Overall Research Aim and Individual Research Objectives 
The overall aim of this research is to facilitate informed decision making regarding 
competing investment options in South Africa’s electricity market, based on the principle 
of a smart energy policy. In order to reach this overall research aim, it is helpful to develop 
sub-objectives as proxies that provide the reader with the necessary background knowledge 
about the specific South African case. Hence, to allow for a sound conclusion in the end, a 
step-wise approach is applied and the following three sub-objectives will be integral parts 
of this thesis.  
The first sub-objective of this thesis is to explore the very unique structure in which South 
Africa’s energy market evolved to what it is today. This is a necessary element to be able 
to understand the context for future investment decisions. Specifically, the aim is to 
advance an understanding about the historical development, different actors and 
stakeholders on the market that will be affected by decisions, on current market structure, 
as well as on future policy plans that will guide investment decisions.  
The second sub-objective of this research is to introduce and evaluate critically a common 
method to compare the costs of different technologies. This is ought to be an evaluation of 
the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) approach and an evaluation of its shortfalls. Based 
on this, lacking aspects should be incorporated into a more comprehensive framework that 
comprises environmental and social dimensions to arrive at a full-cost analysis.  
The third sub-objective of this research is to exert the framework developed in the second 
step empirically into practice and apply it for the case of South Africa. As an outcome, 
different technology choices should be made comparable between each other. 
The last sub-objective is to conclude on future investment options that are favorable to 
overcome the trade-off between cheap, clean and secure energy in a sustainable manner.  
The research strategy for this thesis can be best described as a stepwise approach, 
providing first the background, then a methodology and finally the application of that 
methodology on the case of a specific country. In this work, relevant research subjects are 
in the end the citizen of South Africa, as they are the ones affected by the outcome of the 
analysis. In principle, this research will be carried out using literature review of primary 
and secondary data as the main data collection techniques.  
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1.4 Value of this Research 
This research adds value to the research community in several dimensions. First, through 
its literature review it reduces complexity in a very fragmented and complicated political 
environment that has developed a certain level of institutional inertia which seems difficult 
to overcome. Thus, the thesis provides a clear overview to potential investors who are not 
very familiar with the structure of the South African market on what stakeholders, laws 
and policies are important for their investment decisions.   
Furthermore, the research contributes in that it tries to provide a comprehensive approach 
to measure the full costs of electricity generation by including social and environmental 
factors as decision criteria. The need for such a comprehensive analysis was stipulated by 
Sebitosi & Pillay (2008a), who claimed that RES must be reevaluated given the likely 
emergence of carbon markets and the omission of environmental aspects and human well-
being in traditional models for costing energy generation.  
In addition, the outcome of this research provides the reader with an up-to-date cost 
analysis in 2012 ZAR currency values. At the same time it is clear that the empirical 
outcome will certainly be subject to change rather sooner than later in a quickly developing 
energy market. Costs are affected strongly by varying input factors such as fuel costs, 
learning rates, economies of scale, and these can be higher for some technologies than for 
others. Thus, the outcomes obtained in this thesis are under a constant need for verification 
regarding the accuracy of the input data used for cost calculations.  
Last but not least, this research fits well into a period, where the pressure on the power 
sectors of emerging economies is rising from various perspectives. Be it the request of the 
international community to contribute to climate change abatement or, at the other side, be 
it internal pressure from a steadily growing demand for electricity, emerging economies all 
face similar investment decision problems regarding their power sectors. A methodology 
that includes the internalization of externalities into the LCOE, displayed through the 
example of South Africa is thus a valuable exercise for the research community as results 
might be transferable to similar countries.    
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1.5 Outline Structure 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The first chapter provides the reader with the necessary background on the South African 
energy market and includes a description of the impediments to renewable energy 
deployment. Based on this, the research focus is explained, the overall research aim is 
derived and individual sub-objectives are identified. Chapter 1 also includes a description 
of the value of this research.   
Chapter 2: Structure of the South African Power Market 
In the second chapter, the evolution of the South African power market is described based 
on a broad literature review. The market transformation, regulations and relevant 
stakeholders are described. Socio-economic aspects including market size, technology mix, 
externalities and access to power are covered. The chapter ends with an illumination of 
current policies that will guide the future development of the market.  
Chapter 3: Research Methods 
Chapter 3 introduces the Levelized Cost of Electricity approach to the reader and provides 
a discussion of its benefits and flaws. The framework is extended with an inclusion of 
indirect costs of electricity generation and of non-monetary aspects of energy planning to 
allow for a full cost comparison between different generation technologies.   
Chapter 4: Economic, environmental and social analysis of technologies 
In this chapter, relevant generation technologies for the South African electricity market 
are individually assessed, based on the methodology developed in chapter 3. Research 
findings are presented, contrasted and discussed. Subsequently, the stability of the obtained 
results is tested through a sensitivity analysis with regard to selected parameters.   
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In the last chapter, conclusions are drawn and outlined based on the context and results 
obtained from the previous chapters. From that, recommendations for the stakeholders in 
the market are derived and introduced. Finally, this chapter also includes a critical self-
reflection and provides suggestions for further research that emerged throughout the 
research process.    
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2. Structure of the South African Power Market 
2.1 Evolution 
The South African power market has evolved over more than 130 years and is today 
Africa’s largest and most dominant electricity market. Consequently, the sector was 
subject to a variety of changing legislations and regulations, which became especially 
evident during the past 20 years after the official end of the apartheid regime. Since then, 
market conditions in the electricity supply and demand markets have changed 
substantially. Therefore, it is helpful to give an overview on the historical evolvement of 
the South African power market and its institutional inertia to be able to understand the 
current picture and variety of stakeholder interests in the market. This is followed by a 
description of socio-economic market characteristics, and of new developments and 
policies guiding the market.  
2.1.1 Historical market development before 1994 
The history of electricity supply and demand in South Africa dates back as far as 1881. In 
that year, the first electric lights were installed in Cape Town in the British Cape Colony, 
only two years after Thomas Edison had invented them in the United States. The 
advantages that electricity would bring were recognized soon and the use of electricity 
quickly spread to the inner part of the then Boer-ruled South African Republic. The main 
beneficiary was the gold mining industry. As early as 1895, first small hydro- and steam-
powered electricity power plants were in operation in the main cities of Cape Town, 
Johannesburg and Pretoria (Eberhard, 2003).  
Likewise, the gold mining industry was the driving force behind the development of 
further power stations. In the years around 1900, the mining industry recognized that 
existing power plants where too small in capacity and that more energy was needed for 
their mining processes. This proved to be the beginning of the idea of “larger and 
centralized power plants” in South Africa, which provide cheap and reliable electricity 
supply to the industry. Soon, several mining companies bundled their forces and gave 
concessions to newly founded electricity companies that would provide them with the 
necessary electricity. Coal was then introduced for electricity generation in thermal power 
plants (Kolb, 2009). Subsequently, both private companies and municipalities started to 
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produce electricity from a variety of technologies and under a variety of municipal laws 
and regulations in order to cover the increasing electricity demand (Eberhard, 2003).  
To bundle new individual power stations into a network and to deliver power to railroads 
and nearby cities, the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) was created in the 
government’s Electricity Act of 1922, with a mandate to supply electricity at the least cost 
possible. Likewise, a first regulatory body, the Electricity Control Board (ECB) was 
installed. New licenses to private companies and municipalities were issued at a limited 
scope by the ECB and preference was given to ESCOM’s own electricity generation 
projects. Large investments were made into coal-fired power stations fuelled by cheap 
domestic low-grade sub-bituminous coal. In this way, the state secured more and more 
influence in the electricity sector and was able to suppress competition, which was seen to 
be wasteful at that time, as Eberhard (2003) explains. The main political purpose of this 
strategy was to allow for world competitive resources and mining sectors that were very 
energy-intensive (Renfrew, 1984). As a result, South Africa soon possessed one of the 
cheapest sources for electricity in the world.  
In 1948, the National Party took over and eventually installed the apartheid regime which 
lasted until 1994. This time period was also crucial to how the electricity sector developed, 
as power stations brought online during that time are still running in many cases. In 
addition, energy politics from the National Party had a huge impact on the availability of 
electricity throughout the country and authors such as Renfrew (1984) and Steyn (1995) 
claim that it was also used by the white government as a means for social control of the 
suppressed Black population.  
Around 1950, ESCOM had cemented its position as a vertically integrated monopoly by 
taking ownership over the national transmission grid and parts of the distribution grid. As 
in many other developing countries, high economic growth rates implied the need for 
capacity enlargements in electricity generation. Starting from the 1960s, state-guaranteed 
investments into a number of base load coal power plants were made through ESCOM and 
these were mainly located next to coal mines in the Mpumalanga Province. Table 1 shows 
a list of coal power stations build:  
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Table 1: Electricity generation capacity enlargements with coal power plants 
Name  
of power plant 
Year(s) grid integration 
First unit – last unit 
Installed net  
capacity in MW 
Location 
Komati* 1961 – 1966 940 Middleburg, Mpumalanga 
Camden* 1966 – 1969 1510 Ermelo, Mpumalanga 
Grootvlei* 1969 – 1977  1200  Balfour, Mpumalanga 
Hendrina 1970 – 1977  1965 Hendrina, Mpumalanga 
Arnot 1971 – 1975  2352 Middleburg, Mpumalanga 
Kriel 1976 – 1979  3000 Kriel, Mpumalanga 
Matla 1979 – 1983  3600 Kriel, Mpumalanga 
Duvha 1980 – 1984  3600 Witbank, Mpumalanga 
Tutuka 1984 – 1990  3654 Standerton, Mpumalanga 
Lethabo 1985 – 1990  3708 Sasolburg, Free State 
Matimba 1987 – 1991  3990 Lephalale, Limpopo 
Kendal 1988 – 1993  4116 Witbank, Mpumalanga 
Majuba 1992 – 2001  4110 Volksrust, Mpumalanga 
Cumulated installed net capacity in MW  37745  
Sources:(Eskom, 2012a, Eskom, 2013g) 
* These power stations have been mothballed between 1980 and 1990 and were re-commissioned between 
2005 and 2008.  
With the oil crisis in 1973, South Africa’s economy shifted towards a substitution of oil 
with electricity and consequently peak demand growth rates skyrocketed with demand 
increases of 6 – 16 % per year from 1972 to 1982 (Eberhard, 2003). This situation induced 
yet more commitments for capacity increases and the fear of power shortages was 
permanent at that time. The capacity increases were not used to electrify rural areas. 
Instead, the electricity supply was concentrated to major cities, industries and the farms of 
white farmers (Steyn, 1995). Increasing costs and poor financial management with 
capacity enlargements triggered a government enquiry in 1983, where ESCOM was 
accused of questionable investment decisions, accounting principles and forecasting 
methods from the De Villiers government. Out of this trial originated a new Electricity Act 
in 1987. ESCOM was forced to undergo an organizational restructuring process and was 
renamed in Eskom (Bekker et al., 2008). Eskom’s new mandate was described by Gentle 
(2009) in providing “the system by which the electricity needs of the consumer may be 
satisfied in the most cost-effective manner, subject to resource constraints and the national 
interest”. 
After the Electricity Act was passed, Eskom was no longer subject to price regulations and 
licensing through the ECB, leading Steyn (1995) to assert that the role of the ECB was 
literally marginalized. As Eberhard (2003) points out, since then electricity retail prices are 
controlled by the Electricity Council, and are subject to government review and approval.  
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The political end of the apartheid regime came in 1994 and things have changed 
dramatically since then in South Africa’s electricity sector. The following section 
summarizes the more recent developments. 
2.1.2 Restructuring process after 1994 
With the African National Congress (ANC) coming into power in 1994, Bekker et al. 
(2008) allude that the years between 1994 and 1999 represented a period of transition 
where “…apartheid frameworks and policies were dismantled or reformed, a new 
constitution was adopted, new government institutions were created at national, regional 
and local levels, and other institutional reforms were carried out…”. They also comment 
that as an outcome of this transition period, most of the institutions that had been created 
after the political change started to work effectively from the year 2000. Eberhard (2007) 
concurs that a major achievement of ANC’s policy reforms was the shift away from the 
state-centered orientation advocated by the National Party, towards a more market-oriented 
economy and tendencies of liberalization.  
If this was true for other sectors, for the electricity sector, however, liberalization and 
deregulation have not been implemented completely and the worldwide trend throughout 
the past 20 years to unbundle state-owned electricity utilities has thus not fully 
materialized in South Africa. Even in the year 2013, Eskom still remains a state-controlled 
utility, though in the legal form of a holding, with business operations in electricity 
generation, transmission, trading and distribution (DPE, 2013). Galen (1998) derived a 
main reason for the lack of competition from his assessment that two out of three drivers 
for more competition did not exist in South Africa during the last decade of the 20
th
 
century. He specified a lack in cost and price drivers and in service quality, while he saw 
that adequacy of supply was an existing driver for more competition in the market.  
Nevertheless, the new government has started a restructuring process for the electricity 
sector, which proved to be a very complex undertaking. This was manifested in a variety of 
new policies, stakeholders and transformations of the market. In retrospect, it proves 
difficult to identify a continuous and straightforward strategy of the government. This view 
is also supported by Sebitosi & Pillay (2008b)  who have disclosed “…uncoordinated and 
at times conflicting approaches by various arms of the government…”. In more than one 
case, a decision has been dismissed and an opposite action has been followed later. This 
was for instance the case with the Renewable Energy Feed-In-Tariff (REFIT) program or 
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the introduction of Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs) which were both revised short 
time after being implemented. Another shortfall was mentioned by Fakir (2012) who 
criticized the introduction of an Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity (IRP) before the 
broader energy concept, the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) was introduced. He added that 
this has led to negative effects on overall carbon emissions.   
To keep track of all the new stakeholders, market transformations and policies, which have 
been implemented since 1994, an illustration might be useful. Figure 1 provides a 
chronological overview of the most important new elements in South Africa’s power sector 
reform after 1994. A description of the main new policies and market transformations 
follows below, while new stakeholder bodies will be described separately in Chapter 2.1.3.  
Figure 1: Chronological schema of power sector reform in South Africa after 1994 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
ANC government 
The overall new strategy of the new ANC government in 1994 was to address existing 
inequalities and injustices and to transform society and economy accordingly. Broken 
down to a transformation of the electricity sector, this implied four main aspects: One 
major focus was put on countrywide electrification, with the aim of overcoming the 
massive prevailing back-lock in grid connection of many rural and urban black South 
Africans. Simultaneously, a focus was put on the economic and political empowerment of 
large parts of the marginalized black population. A third focus was put on the restructuring 
of state-owned enterprises, including the energy utility Eskom. Restructuring plans from 
the ANC also included a focus on the optimization of new investments into the electricity 
supply industry to make the electricity system more accessible and efficient (Eberhard, 
2007, Turkson and Wohlgemuth, 2000).  
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Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) 
In 1996, the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) was introduced as a market for 
electricity exchange with the goal to make reliable and economical electricity available to 
all member countries. As Sebitosi (2010) argues, the main advantages with the creation of 
a regional SAPP market were seen in cost reductions, optimized use of large-scale 
generation units, improved system reliability and security of supply, as well as risk 
pooling. Today, the SAPP is a day-ahead market and has 16 member parties from 12 
countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region.
1
 As Graeber 
et al. (2005) pointed out, the SAPP takes an important role in balancing the market during 
peak demand periods. The actual monthly volume in electricity traded ranged between 39 
MWh and 4953 MWh at average monthly system prices between 270.85 and 722.34 
ZAR/MWh during the year 2012. Matched sales and buy bids were always higher, but 
transmission constraints regularly made a good proportion of matched sales impossible for 
actual exchange (SAPP, 2012). The South African utility Eskom is by far the biggest 
participant in the SAPP and accounted for almost 79% of the installed capacity in 2010 
(SAPP, 2010).  
South African Bulk Renewable Energy Generation Program (SABRE-Gen) 
The SABRE-Gen program was established in 1998 and is an in-house program from the 
state utility Eskom. It was introduced to obtain scientific evaluations of potentially viable 
utility-scale electricity supply technologies and projects for South Africa. The program 
includes research and feasibility studies on bio-energy, wind power, concentrating solar 
power (CSP) and wave power (Eskom, 2006).  
White Paper on Energy Policy (WPEP) 
The WPEP was released in 1998 as the centerpiece for South Africa’s future energy policy 
during the next decade and it represents “the basic direction for energy service delivery 
strategies and their implementation towards achieving the national goals.” (Ziramba, 2008) 
As mentioned by Maleka et al. (2010), these include increased access to affordable energy 
services, improved energy governance, stimulation of economic development, 
                                                 
1
 The member parties are: Botswana Power Cooperation, Copperbelt Energy Cooperation (Zambia), 
Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi, Eskom (South Africa), Electricidade de Mozambique, HCB 
(Mozambique), Lesotho Electricity Corporation, Nam Power (Namibia), Societe National d' Electricite 
(Democratic Republic of Congo), Swaziland Electricity Company, Tanzania Electric Supply Company 
Limited, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation Limited, 
MOTRACO (Mozambique), Lunsemfwa Hydro Power Company (Zambia) and Empresa Nacional de 
Electricidade (Angola). 
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management of energy-related environmental and health-effects and increased security of 
supply through diversification. With this new strategy paper, South Africa formally started 
to express a paradigm shift in its energy policy. The times of mere focus on security of 
supply, for instance expressed through the costly build-up of overcapacities on the supply 
side, the nuclear power program with only one nuclear power station or the synthetic fuels 
program during times of the political embargo against the Apartheid regime came then 
formally to an end. A new orientation towards the attraction of new private investment into 
the energy sector and improved efficiency through competition was advanced. As Sebitosi 
& Pillay (2008b) pointed out, the WPEP can also be seen as the document that has set 
energy politics into a broader context, by recognizing that everybody in South Africa 
should have the right to a peaceful and intact environment in the present and in the future. 
Thus, the authors advocate that legislation has to be adapted in a way that prevents from 
pollution and ecological degradation and that ensures conservation and sustainable 
development while promoting economic and social development. The former Minister of 
Minerals and Energy, Penuell Maduna, has also emphasized in his ministerial foreword to 
the White Paper (DME, 1998), that in addition to that, energy should be available to all 
citizen at an affordable cost. 
Managed liberalization process 
Following the WPEP, the South African Cabinet approved proposals for a reform of the 
Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) and the Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI) in May 
2001. According to Eberhard (2007), main points brought forward concerning the 
restructuring of the ESI consisted in a break of Eskom’s supply monopoly with a limitation 
of its share in electricity supply to 70%, leaving 30 % to Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs). The Cabinet also decided to establish a separate and state-owned transmission 
company. Furthermore, it agreed on changing the market structure into a multi-market 
model electricity market framework, allowing for transactions on a power exchange, for 
balancing mechanisms and bilateral delivery contracts. In addition, the Cabinet agreed to 
develop a new regulatory framework to ensure the market participation of IPPs. In terms of 
the EDI, an equally important decision was taken: to unbundle distribution, EDI Holdings 
Company was scheduled to be incorporated and the Eskom-managed electricity 
distribution grid was supposed to be divided between six new Regional Electricity 
Distributors (REDs) (Cassim et al., 2003).  
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Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) 
The IEP is a macro-economic policy roadmap and planning framework and includes all 
aspects of the energy planning process for the Republic of South Africa. Its ultimate aim is 
to guide and provide a vision on future energy infrastructure investments, by modeling 
different scenarios. The compilation of an IEP was scheduled in the White Paper on 
Energy Policy of 1998 and subsequently a first IEP was issued in 2003 (DoE, 2012a). 
According to the Energy Act of 2008, the Minister of Energy has a mandate to review and 
publish the IEP on an annual basis. An updated IEP was initially scheduled for 2012, but is 
still under development and according to McLaughlin (2012), the final draft for the cabinet 
can be estimated in mid-2013. The IRP will be incorporated as a sub-part of the next IEP. 
White paper on Renewable Energy (WPRE) 
The WPRE was published by the DME in November 2003 and complements the WPEP 
from 1998. It was brought forward in the spirit of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, which was held in Johannesburg in 2002 (Maleka et al., 2010). The main 
goals of this policy document are to ensure that RES will help to diversify and secure the 
energy supply by gaining a foothold in the South African energy mix, and that they are 
developed optimally, given their vast resource potential in the country. Suitable RE 
technologies mentioned in the WPRE are wind, biomass, hydropower, solar, wave energy, 
ocean currents and energy from waste. The government committed to encourage the 
deployment of RES by facilitating private investments into the market and through the 
introduction of independent power producers (IPPs). As former Deputy Minister of 
Minerals and Energy, Susan Shabangu, has suggested in her foreword to the WPRE (DME, 
2003), the development of the RE sector should also contribute to the further electrification 
of disadvantaged communities, the development of human capacity building programs, and 
to the stimulation and commercialization of local manufacturing of RE systems. To make 
progress on RES deployment measureable, the DME (2003) has set itself the following 
target:  
“10 000 GWh (0.8 Mtoe) renewable energy contribution to final energy consumption by 
2013, to be produced mainly from biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydro. The 
renewable energy is to be utilised for power generation and non-electric technologies such 
as solar water heating and bio-fuels. This is approximately 4% (1667 MW) of the projected 
electricity demand for 2013 (41539 MW). This is equivalent to replacing two (2x 660 MW) 
units of Eskom's combined coal fired power stations. This is in addition to the estimated 
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existing (in 2000) renewable energy contribution of 115 278 GWh/annum (mainly from 
fuelwood and waste).” 
The WPRE lists a number of potential barriers to the deployment of RES. These include a 
lack of non-discriminatory open access to the national electricity grid, the fact that RES 
remain expensive compared to coal because they account for higher capital costs, and last 
but not least, legal, regulatory and organizational barriers (DME, 2003). 
Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) 
The REFIT was introduced in March 2009 by the National Energy Regulator of South 
Africa (NERSA). With the introduction of this feed-in tariff scheme, the NERSA followed 
the international trend of establishing support mechanisms for RES to trigger much needed 
environmentally friendly capacity enlargements for electricity generation. The main benefit 
of the REFIT was seen in the creation of investment incentives for private RE projects. 
Hence, the support scheme was designed such that it guaranteed power producers a fixed 
rate of income over 20 years for each KWh fed into the national power grid, a rate that 
should allow potential investors to cover their full costs and gain a reasonable premium. 
NERSA calculated the rates based on the LCOE methodology and these were subject to a 
review every year (NERSA, 2009). In phase I, feed-in tariffs for wind, CSP, small hydro 
and landfill gas were introduced. In phase II, large PV, biomass and biogas were added and 
the tariffs for CSP were revised. Table 2 lists the fixed purchase prices for electricity 
generated from these technologies, as guaranteed by the REFIT phase I and phase II.  
Table 2: REFIT compensation scheme 
Technology Compensation in ZAR/KWh 
REFIT Phase I 
Wind 1.25 
CSP through with 6 hour storage 2.10 
Small hydro (<10 MW) 0.94  
Landfill gas 0.90  
REFIT Phase II 
CSP through without storage 3.14  
Large scale grid connected PV  (≥1 MW) 3.94  
Biomass solid 1.18 
Biogas 0.96 
CSP tower with 6 hours storage 2.31 
Sources: (Mbatha, 2011, Pegels, 2010) 
To bring renewable electricity into the public grid, a power purchase agreement (PPA) had 
to be signed, between a power producer and Eskom. In retrospect, this proved to be the 
18 
 
weak point of the REFIT program as no PPA had been made available by Eskom, even two 
years after the program started (Kernan, 2013). Thus, the DoE announced in July 2011, 
that a competitive element should be included in the distribution of PPAs. In the end, the 
REFIT program as initially planned was given up due to barriers in its implementation 
stemming from instability in political support and without that one single MW of RE 
capacity had been installed under its tariff (Pegels, 2012). As Pienaar (2011) pointed out, it 
was even believed to be unconstitutional by some stakeholders, given that fairness, 
equitability, transparence, competitiveness and cost-efficiency of the tariff were perceived 
questionable.  
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 
The IRP is the long-term policy document for South Africa’s electricity strategy between 
2010 and 2030. It was introduced by the DoE in October 2010 with the purpose to identify 
required investments for the electricity supply sector which are most beneficial to South 
Africa’s national interest, given technical, economic and social constraints as well as 
externalities
2
 (DoE, 2010). Thus, the projections modeled in the IRP provide a likely 
composition of South Africa’s energy mix to cover the expected demand of 454 TWh in 
2030. As input parameters such as technology, demand, financial conditions, electricity 
prices or emission costs might be subject to change in the future, the IRP will need to be 
revised every two years. Though due, an update has not yet been released since the end of 
2012.  
Figure 2: Policy-adjusted scenario for capacity new-builds as adopted in IRP 2010 
 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from (DoE, 2010). 
                                                 
2
 As specified in the IRP, relevant constraints and risks include: a) reduction of carbon emissions, b) new 
technology uncertainties such as costs, operability and lead time to build, c) water usage, d) localization and 
job creation, e) Southern African regional development and integration, and, f) security of supply.  
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Figure 2 illustrates committed and uncommitted additional new capacity builds until 2030. 
If the scenario modeled in the policy-adjusted IRP will materialize, 42% of uncommitted 
new capacity will be from RES. Accordingly, RE would then account for 9 % in total 
electricity production by 2030. If already committed new-builds are included in the picture, 
the capacity share of renewable energy new-builds in South Africa would shrink to 38.8%, 
a drop that was also criticized by Paul (2011).  
REBID 
The REBID program replaced the REFIT scheme in July 2011. With the move to a 
competitive bidding process, the DoE hoped to finally secure required investments into 
RES. The REBID process is organized that the DoE decides on a number of new capacity 
to be installed and then fixes a price ceiling for the most expensive projects. This price 
ceiling was close to the numbers in the 2009 REFIT tariff. In a call for proposals, IPPs are 
then encouraged to underbid themselves to secure a project. In that way, the government 
tries to obtain efficient allocations for RES projects. In order to be eligible to bid, IPPs 
must first apply for a license issued from the NERSA.  
Economists have expressed ambivalent opinions about South Africa’s new REBID policy: 
Becker and Fischer (2012) declared that the bidding concept has been proven successful in 
other emerging countries such as China and India. Nevertheless, they also identified a 
pitfall in the fact that a bidding process includes a higher risk for project developers, which 
has to be compensated for and thus increases their bidding price. Furthermore they argue 
that auctioning generally favors large and financially solvent companies and might 
represent an entry barrier for new start-up companies in the sector. On the other hand, 
Pegels (2012) demonstrated that the introduction of the REBID scheme has provided more 
security and stability to the RE market and is thus positive for South Africa.  
Initially, the DoE has committed to a capacity purchase of 3725 MW from RES in three 
bidding rounds. The bidding process is now formally called the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Programme (REIPPP). During a first bidding phase, 1452 
MW of capacity enlargement were auctioned at the least cost, leading to 28 different 
projects in Wind, PV and CSP to come online before the end of June 2014.
3
 In a second 
bidding round, 1044 MW of capacity builds were secured in 19 projects. According to the 
OECD (2013), the price for solar PV projects was driven down by 40% in the second 
                                                 
3
 CSP projects have to reach commercial operation by 2016.  
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bidding phase compared to the beginning. The entirety of the REIPPP was valued at 
ZAR100-billion and further plans for an additional procurement of 3200 MW until 2020 
are in the pipeline as energy minister Peters confirmed (Creamer, 2012a).  
The recent developments show that policies for RE have been very unforeseeable from an 
investors perspective. Consequently, these have to cope with a high level of uncertainty 
regarding support mechanisms for RE deployment in South Africa. Nevertheless, interest 
in developing RE is prevalent, a fact that can be seen by the number of bids submitted in 
the REIPPP tenders. Sebitosi (2008b) sees a main reasons for the difficulty in establishing 
effective energy policies in the lack of availability of good and reliable energy data.  
2.1.3 Stakeholders 
In this section the most important stakeholders with an influence on the South African 
electricity market will be introduced. Figure 3 gives an overview of these:  
Figure 3: Overview of stakeholders in the electricity market 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Department of Energy (DoE)  
The main task of the DoE is to ensure “…exploration, development, processing, use and 
management of South Africa’s energy resources” (GCIS, 2011). The department was 
established in 2009 and is currently led by the Minister of Energy, Ms Dipuo Peters. It 
emerged from the former DME which was split into two separate state departments for 
minerals and for energy. The DoE initiates new energy legislation and suggests them to the 
Parliament. It has also the responsibility to oversee the State-Owned Entities (SOE) that 
play a role in the energy sector. These are two regulatory bodies, the National Energy 
Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) and the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR), as well as 
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the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA), the Petroleum, Oil and Gas 
Corporation of South Africa (PetroSA), the South African National Energy Development 
Institute (SANEDI) and the Central Energy Fund Group (CEF). 
National Electricity Regulator 
The National Electricity Regulator (NER) was established in 1995 as the national 
regulatory authority for the electricity industry. It was replaced by the NERSA in 2004.   
National Treasury Department 
The National Treasury is responsible for coordinating South Africa’s macroeconomic 
fiscal policy. It took a role in terminating the REFIT scheme when it questioned its 
competitiveness, cost-effectiveness and constitutional legality. It was also involved in 
developing the REIPPP auctioning process and authors such as Pegels (2012) were 
surprised by the strong role it plays in shaping South Africa’s renewable energy policy.  
Lobbying Organizations 
There exists a wide spectrum of industry associations and lobbying organizations to 
support literally any interest in the Southern African energy landscape. An overview of the 
most important ones can be found in Appendix 1.   
Electricity Distribution Holdings (EDIH) 
The Electricity Distribution Holdings was incorporated in 1999 as a vehicle to transform 
the electricity distribution sector. EDIH’s mandate was to establish six independent REDs. 
The intention of this measure was to remove risks from a large number of small 
distributors and to create a regional distribution structure that would be secure, reliable, 
affordable and easier to regulate (Patel, 2004). In reality, negotiations with many 
municipalities continued for a long time, and many of them were reluctant to give away 
their distribution assets which were often an important source of income for them. These 
difficulties finally lead the DoE to the decision to abandon the idea of REDs and the EDIH 
was terminated in March 2011. As a consequence, a serious backlog in investments in the 
distribution grid has occurred over the last years, which is also seen as a major problem for 
South Africa’s distribution grid by ex-EDIH chief operating officer De Beer (2011, cited in 
(Hutchinson, 2011) and Eberhard (2012).   
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Eskom Holdings SOC Limited 
Eskom was corporatized into Eskom Holdings SOC Limited with the Eskom Conversion 
Act of 2001. The transformation into a public company was part of a broader process of 
restructuring of South African SOEs and the company is since then subject to tax liability 
and dividends payments. The state holds 100% of Eskom’s shares. With almost 45,000 
employees, Eskom is the dominant market player in South Africa’s electricity market. 
Business operations comprise generation, transmission and distribution of 95% of the 
electricity consumed in the country. In 2012, Eskom generated 90.4% of its electricity 
from coal, 5.6% from nuclear, 0.8% from hydro, 1.2% from pumped storage, 0.3% from 
gas, while 1.7% were purchased from IPPs (Eskom, 2013b).  
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) 
The NERSA replaced the NER in 2004. With this transformation, the government pursued 
the goal to pool the regulatory needs for the gas, the petroleum pipelines and the electricity 
sector under one responsible regulatory body.  
NERSA has obtained its mandate for the electricity sector from Section 16(1) (a) and (b) in 
the Electricity Regulation Act No. 4, 2006, which consists in approving the rates and 
conditions of service that Eskom is allowed to charge for the electricity delivered (2006). 
This way, the NERSA has a direct influence on the revenue stream that Eskom will have. 
Approval is only justified, if Eskom can demonstrate that a change in its tariff is merited, 
due to increasing or decreasing costs. Eskom’s pricing policy is thus driven by a cost of 
service methodology, where prudent and efficient costs are recovered through the allowed 
tariffs and where incentive mechanisms are provided to improve technical and economic 
efficiency (Eskom, 2012e). This are means to regulate the state-owned monopoly supplier 
at least to some extent.  
In practice, price regulation has materialized in the formulation of Multi-Year Price 
Determinations (MYPDs) with the first one established in April 2006. Since then, Eskom 
is entitled to apply for an average increase of its tariffs over the next 3-year periods.
4
 This 
average increase is calculated based on separate price increases for municipal and non-
municipal tariffs. Within the MYPD phases, Eskom can apply for cost adjustments if costs 
are believed to differ with regard to the 3-year forecasts. Factors that allow for price 
adjustments might be fuel price volatility, fuel mix uncertainty, energy demand uncertainty 
                                                 
4
 In the 3
rd
 MYPD round from 2013 – 2018, NERSA approved a 5-year price determination period.  
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and calorific value uncertainty with regards to coal supplies. To allow for a more 
transparent and participative process of price determination, NERSA has hosted several 
public hearings and consultations rounds with regard to changes in the methodology of the 
MYPD schemes. From the draft consultation paper (NERSA, 2008) can be inferred that 
Eskom has had considerable influence on the design and update of the MYPD regulations.  
Stakeholders such as Greenpeace (2012) have criticized the role of NERSA and claim that 
the regulator became only fully operational in 2008. They have also argued that NERSA’s 
power in controlling South Africa’s monopolized generation and transmission sectors is 
rather weak, and that its main role consisted in adjudicating Eskom’s price applications.    
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
IPPs are defined as independent if neither Eskom nor the public has a stake in their 
company assets (SAIPPA, 2011). According to Pegels (2010), they play a major role in the 
desired liberalization and diversification of the South African electricity market in the way 
that they bring more innovation and competition to a market where Eskom is acting with 
core competencies in fossil fuel technologies. However, she advocates that a functioning 
level playing field cannot yet be observed as Eskom still remains the monopsonic buyer of 
IPP-produced electricity with its single buyer office (SBO). Fortunately, the government 
has understood that there exists a conflict of interest for Eskom when it is obliged to buy 
energy from its potential competitors and it thus initiated an improvement of the situation 
with planned introduction of an Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO).  
The possibility for IPPs to sell renewable energy under the REIPPP program has drawn the 
attention of many potential market entrants. As Buthelezi (2012) alluded, Eskom has 
received as many as 599 expressions of interest by September 2012 from IPPs who wanted 
to engage in power production projects. Unfortunately, it had to refuse most of them as 
only IPPs with whom the Eskom SBO has signed PPAs under the REIPPP are legally 
allowed to have grid access. It appears that this is a major disadvantage of a policy 
instrument which dictates the amount of RES to be deployed and consequently limits 
market growth.  
Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) 
If the number of IPPs and with them the amount of installed RE capacity becomes larger, 
the potential for a conflict of interest between the Eskom SBO and other Eskom 
departments is likely to increase. In such a more complex market with an aimed IPP share 
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of 30%, Eskom could quickly experience trade-offs between prioritizing own projects and 
fulfilling system integration obligations for IPPs. Therefore, the concept of an independent 
entity that takes care of planning and operating the transmission system and the market was 
considered by President Jacob Zuma (2010) in his state of the nation address in 2010. This 
initiative has been supported by Pegels (2010) who argued that the creation of an 
independent entity for operating both the transmission system and the market is 
indispensable to a more enabling environment for renewable energy producers. This would 
indeed be a major step to reduce the market power of Eskom and improve investment 
conditions for IPPs.  
Consequently, a draft ISMO bill has been tabled in the Parliament in March 2012 but has 
not yet been adopted since then and is still subject to public consultation (Independent 
System and Market Operator Draft Bill, 2012). It was suggested that ISMO would be 
responsible for electricity generation planning, system operation and expansion, buying 
electricity from generators, and selling it to customers. Critics of the bill, such as Haffejee, 
(2010, in Creamer, 2010) and Eskom itself, advocated that a transformation from an 
Eskom SBO to ISMO would require two to three years. This would be too longsome in the 
current situation, where a quick accommodation of IPP- power as defined in the IRP is 
necessary.  
If the bill is adopted though, the SBO will be transformed from a ring-fenced entity within 
Eskom’s System Market Operator Division into the ISMO. The envisaged stepwise 
transformation process is highlighted in figure 4: 
Figure 4: Phased deployment model for ISMO 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Independent System and Market Operator Draft Bill (2012). 
After the development of the electricity sector was outlined in the previous chapters and 
relevant stakeholders and policies that influence the market have been introduced, the 
following chapter will portray the socio-economic characteristics of the electricity market. 
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2.2 Socio-economic aspects 
2.2.1 Market size 
In 2010, South Africa was Africa’s biggest market in terms of electricity supply. In total, 
the country accounted for 39.8% of the continent’s electricity production, which placed it 
largely in front of Egypt and Algeria (IEA, 2012c). During Eskom’s financial year 2012, 
total electricity supply amounted to 254.4 TWh, with the major share coming from 
Eskom’s own power production and minor shares originating from electricity imports and 
IPP production. Internal use for wheeling, pumping
5
 and internal sales accounted for 7.6 
TWh. A further 22 TWh were lost during transmission and distribution processes and in 
the end 224.8 TWh were available for sales in order to cover the electricity demand. Figure 
5 illustrates the supply-side power flows in the year 2012: 
Figure 5: Power flow in South Africa’s ESI in 2012 
 
Source: Own illustration based on (Eskom, 2013b). 
Despite a stagnating demand over the last six years, Eskom was not physically able to 
cover South Africa’s entire electricity demand with the 224.8 TWh it delivered in 2012. 
Van Heerden (2011 in (Lazenby, 2011) has estimated the supply/demand gap for 2012 at 
approximately 6-9 TWh, but as measures to reduce the demand were in place, it is actually 
very difficult to come up with a meaningful figure about the supply shortfall in 2012. The 
situation was mainly problematic during evening peak demand hours and it was recorded 
that Eskom was not in a position to cover the weekly peak demand
6
 from its own 
generation portfolio on 43 out of 52 weeks in 2012 (Eskom, 2012f). To fill the gap, 
electricity had to be imported through the SAPP. In addition, measures to conserve energy 
were put in place under the Integrated Demand Management Programme (IDM), in which 
Eskom had adopted elements from Brazil that faced a similar situation in 2001. Measures 
                                                 
5
 Electricity for pumping is required in Eskom’s Drakensberg and Palmiet pumped-storage hydro schemes. 
6
 The average daily peak demand was 35,526 MW in 2012.  
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included for example the “49-million campaign” targeted at the private sector to save 
electricity, as well as contracts with companies from the Energy Intensive User Group 
(EIUG) that allow for load shifting (Eskom, 2011a, Timm, 2012). Figure 6 depicts that 
these two sectors accounted for the biggest part of electricity demand in 2012, followed by 
the commercial sector which was as important as the mining sector: 
Figure 6: Eskom power sales in according to sectors in 2012 
 
Source: Own illustration based on (City of Cape Town, 2011, Eskom, 2013b).  
Future electricity demand as modeled in the IRP scenario is projected to grow on average 
by 2.8 %
7
 per year until 2030. However, there is discordance among economists about the 
methods used in the forecast and several authors have come up with alternative projections. 
For instance, Amusa (2009) suggested that different sectors would respond differently to 
price variations in the future as a result of their differing price elasticity of demand. In their 
decomposition analysis, Inglesi-Lotz and Blignaut (2011) compiled that additional factors 
with considerable influence on future electricity demand in South Africa were changes in 
production outputs, energy efficiency measures and structural change. Ziramba (2008) 
argued that electricity demand from South Africa’s residential sector will not be affected 
much by electricity price changes and consumption will not increase significantly with 
higher incomes due to his low estimates on price and income elasticity of 0.011 and 0.33.  
By now it should have become obvious to the reader that current generation capacity does 
not suffice to cover South Africa’s electricity demand. Investments into capacity expansion 
become necessary and some projects are currently under construction. In order to 
understand the trade-offs that this situation implies, an overview about the technology mix 
existent in the supply industry is helpful. This is provided in the following chapter.    
                                                 
7
 This number is based on the following formula for logarithmic growth:     
          
 
    ; where g 
is growth, xt is the demand in 2030, x0 is the demand in 2010 and t equals time in years. 
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2.2.2 Generation technology mix 
Overall, the generation technology mix is not very diversified in South Africa’s industry. 
In 2012, power generation continued to be extremely reliant on coal, even though IPPs 
contributed to power generation with more than 4.1 TWh.
8
 Due to pressures from the 
demand side, the mothballed coal power plants Komati, Camden and Grootvlei had to be 
re-commissioned. As a result, a massive 92% of Eskom’s 2012 electricity output of 237.3 
TWh was generated in coal power plants with a total nominal capacity of 37,745 MW. For 
the remaining 8% of electricity generated, nuclear power accounted for 5.7%, while 
pumped-storage hydro power contributed with 2% to electricity supply. Other technologies 
that contributed to the remainder were OCGT (fired with diesel oil) and wind, while PV 
and biomass were only deployed on a non-commercial scale (IEA, 2012c). Figure 7 
portrays the importance of alternative energy technologies other than coal in South Africa, 
and contrasts them with regard to electricity generated and generation capacity installed.  
Figure 7: Contribution to electricity supply from technologies other than coal 
 
Source: Own illustration based on (Eskom, 2013b, Eskom, 2013g, IEA, 2012c).  
Committed new build program 
To overcome the existing supply/demand gap, the South African government has 
committed to increase the capacity of the existing generation portfolio. New capacity is to 
be delivered both from Eskom and from IPPs. Although policies aim at a reduction of 
Eskom’s market penetration to 70% and at a 34 % reduction of carbon emissions by 2020 
compared to the ‘Business as Usual’ emission growth trajectory (Patel, 2011), the major 
part of committed new capacity is to come from Eskom’s new coal power plants. Eskom’s 
                                                 
8
 Information about the origin of IPP power generation could not be obtained, but it is estimated that the 4.1 
TWh were produced from non-renewable sources in municipal power stations. IPP power production is not 
included in the 92% coal share of Eskom.  
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new builds currently under construction include the 4
th
 and 5
th
 largest coal power plants in 
the world, Kusile (4800 MW) and Medupi (4764 MW), the Ingula Pumped Storage scheme 
(1,332 MW) and the Sere Windfarm with a nominal capacity of 100 MW. Combined, new 
nominal capacity amounts to 10,996 MW and is to be commissioned in its entirety by 
2018/19 (Eskom, 2012b). In addition, the government has committed to purchase 3,725 
MW of RES from IPPs which are targeted to be online latest in 2016 (DoE, 2012b). In 
total, nominal installed capacity in South Africa will increase by 33% in 2018/19 compared 
to 2012 levels, if all projects are realized in due time. Figure 8 highlights the importance of 
generation technologies for committed capacity increases: 
Figure 8: Nominal capacity of committed short-term new builds by technology 
 
Source: Own illustration based on (Eskom, 2012b, DoE, 2012b, Maphosa, 2012). 
Other options for new builds 
South Africa also possesses a favorable resource base for a variety of other technological 
options that have not been mentioned or deployed on a larger scale so far. These include 
CSP, PV, wind, shale gas, wave power, small-scale hydro and biomass. The resource 
potential of each of these alternatives will be introduced briefly. 
South Africa is endowed with one of the most favorable levels of direct normal solar 
irradiation (DNI) in the world. Yearly DNI levels go beyond 3000 KWh/m² in the north-
western part of the country, which makes the resource potential for direct and indirect solar 
power a vast one. A demonstration-scale CSP project is currently developed by Eskom in 
Upington under conditions that were modeled by Suri (2011) at a DNI of 2816 KWh/m² 
per year. This project is targeted at gaining further knowledge in the CSP central receiver 
technology as a large-scale application, a technology that Eskom (2013c) sees as a key 
concept for future power stations. In addition to CSP technology, the resource potential is 
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also given for other direct and indirect solar power applications such as PV and direct solar 
heating.  
Wind power is another important option for future bulk electricity generation in South 
Africa, and its technical potential to satisfy part of South Africa’s energy demand was 
confirmed in a study by Micklem (2010). Her conclusions were based on a classification of 
the South African territory by Hagemann (2009), but the South African National Energy 
Research Institute (SANERI, 2012) has published a more sophisticated study in 2012, the 
South African Wind Energy Atlas. Here, the resource potential proved to be even higher 
than in previous studies, as more accurate data was collected. What all assessments and 
modeling showed is that South Africa generally possesses many very suitable sites for 
wind turbines, especially along the coast and at exposed locations in the inner part with 
annual average wind speeds of 9-10m/s and higher. A wind-use culture is already 
developed with widespread small-scale off-grid applications on farms. First bulk-electricity 
generation projects are constructed by Eskom and IPPs.  
Recently, shale gas has been discovered in rock formations under South Africa’s Karoo 
desert. The Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) claimed that a quantification of 
recoverable resources shapes up as difficult, if not impossible, due to a lack of data (DMR, 
2012). Other scientists have come up with estimates and according to Lloyd (2011, in 
Botha and Yelland, 2011), resources are in the order of 1000 trillion cubic feet and could 
be a game changer for South Africa’s energy mix, if extracted for power generation. A 
more conservative estimate with a total of 485 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves 
was published by Kuuskraa et al. (2011). If the lower estimates are true, South Africa 
would sit on the 5
th
 largest known unconventional gas reserves. A use of this resource 
could potentially transform the ESI and contribute to a reduction of the share of coal. 
However, the resource is unconventional and thus a controversially discussed issue in 
South Africa. Questions about the sustainability of inevitable fracturing processes and the 
necessary use of scarce water resources are raised by opponents to the technology such as 
the Karoo Action Group (2012) and these have created a strong negative opinion among 
parts of the population towards the extraction of the gas resources. Nevertheless, the South 
African government has lifted an initial moratorium on fracturing in September 2012 and 
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has since then issued technical cooperation permits (TCPs) that allow for initial research 
into the Karoo’s shale gas potential, as reported by Dittrick (2013).9   
Another potential technology that could deliver electricity in South Africa is wave power. 
The Agulhas current is a consistent ocean current and delivers a constant amount of energy 
of 40-60 KW/m (Holman, 2009). If harnessed through existing wave power technologies
10
, 
Gunn and Stock-Williams (2012) estimate that more than 18.7 TWh of power can be 
extracted at the South African coast line per annum. According to Van Niekerck (2012, in 
Dardagan, 2012), director of the Centre for Renewable and Sustainable Energy Studies at 
the University of Stellenbosch, technology is available and only a lack of funding and 
political recognition from the DoE persist as remaining barriers to deploy this technology. 
Advantages he mentioned about wave power were short lead construction times of about 
two years for power plants, as well as their stable and predictable output patterns in 
electricity generation. Eskom has also recognized the potential of this technology and has 
awarded a contract to Hydro Alternative Energy (HEA) to build a 5 MW tidal pilot power 
plant in eThekwini on the KwaZulu-Natal coast in order to assess the economic and 
technological feasibility of larger-scale projects (Botes, 2012). Furthermore, Eskom has 
installed several monitoring systems and data is being collected to gain knowledge about 
other potential sites.   
Last but not least, biomass is a source of energy that can be used to generate bulk 
electricity. Dasappa (2011) has estimated the power potential from biomass for South 
Africa at 643 MW or roughly 4.8 TWh
11
, based on his assumption that 30% from current 
cereal production and  agricultural residues are available as fuel material. His estimate is 
based on current levels of production and does not even include a raw material supply 
structure that is especially targeted for the use of biomass. He attests another advantage to 
biomass with the fact that load factors above 70% are possible in biomass power plants, 
which would make their performance comparable to other centralized power plants. As 
Creamer (2012b) reports, Eskom considers biomass a promising option and is about to start 
a co-generation project in its Arnot power plant in early 2013. As fuel material torrefied 
black pellets will be used. Koko (2012, in Creamer, 2012b) believes this process to be 
                                                 
9
 TCPs are hold by Shell, a Sasol, Chesapeake Energy Corporation and Statoil joint venture and a Falcon Oil 
& Gas Ltd. and Chevron joint venture.  
10
 Resource estimate based on Pelamis power matrix, with a conversion efficiency of 3.1% under South 
Africa conditions.  
11
 Estimate based on a 85% capacity factor in a biomass power plant.  
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profitable from a cost, emission reduction, rural development, industrialization and 
regional integration perspective. But Eskom (2013a) also considers that large scale 
production of biomass could lead to competitive situations with other agricultural 
activities, complex requirements on logistics and substantial need for land areas.    
2.2.3 Market failures 
South Africa’s strong reliance on fossil fuels has its downside also: It is the primary cause 
for a considerable amount of costs borne by society at large. The strategy of non-
diversification of the ESI has in part resulted from below market-price access to coal 
supplies and a non-consideration of external costs in investment choices. The OECD 
(2013) concludes that electricity must be underpriced in South Africa. This is also 
confirmed by Vorster et al. (2011) who describe that “the country is not yet at the point, 
where the true costs of climate change are fully reflected in the relative prices of goods and 
services, or where future public and private investment strategies in the energy and 
industrial sectors assume an escalating price on carbon”.  
In fact, South Africa emitted an absolute amount of 457.6 MtCO2–eq.
12
in 2010. Thereof, 
Eskom emitted more than 49% through its power plant fleet. On average, 0.97 kg/KWh of 
CO2-eq. were released to the atmosphere (Eskom, 2010). According to calculations from 
the OECD (2013), this was about 60% above world average. If this performance is 
compared with other middle-income countries, South Africa is amongst the most emission-
intensive middle-income economies. This is highlighted in figure 9: 
Figure 9: GHG emissions per capita in middle-income countries in 2008 
 
 Source: (OECD, 2013) 
                                                 
12
 CO2-equivalents are calculated based on the definition from the 4
th
 UNFCCC Assessment Report.  
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Apart from GHG emissions, the OECD and Eskom also publish statistics on other 
externalities occurring from the activities of the South African ESI. These include releases 
of SO2, NOx, particulates and radiation, radioactive waste disposal, water consumption, 
employee fatalities and transmission losses. No statistics on indirect health effects of these 
technologies and on benefits from electrification were published though.  
Three studies have been published so far that focused on a monetary quantification of 
externalities related to electricity generation in South Africa (Thopil and Anastassios, 
2010). A first study was conducted by Dutkiewicz and de Villiers in 1990 following a top-
down damage cost approach. Resulting external costs were rather lower than in 
comparable international studies. A second study was conducted in 1996 by Van Horen 
(1997). After the ANC came into power, he was asked to reevaluate costs for electricity 
generation. Backed with international financial support, site-specific data and the help of 
the EXMOD modeling tool, Van Horen was able to apply a bottom-up damage cost 
approach. His major findings were that the nuclear industry benefited from high subsidies 
and that GHG emissions represented the major part of externalities from coal power, 
followed by health impacts.  
Building on Van Horen’s study, Spalding-Fecher and Matibe (2003) focused on a more 
comprehensive definition of externalities. Using a damage-cost approach as underlying 
methodology, Spalding-Fecher and Matibe accounted for both positive and negative 
externalities from electricity generation. Positive externalities included, for example, health 
benefits resulting from fuel switching
13
 or from the reduction of public wood scarcity. 
Negative externalities included air pollution, health effects and climate change damages. In 
their study, they calculated the net sum of external costs in Eskom coal-fired production to 
be between 1.4 and 9.3 c/KWh, with a central estimate of 4.4 c/KWh.
14
 Inflated to 2011 
real Rand values, these costs would increase to 3.37 c/KWh for the low, to 10.58 c/KWh 
for the central and to 22.36 c/KWh for the high case scenario respectively. The category 
with the highest effect on total external costs was reported to be climate change damages. 
At a standard average electricity price
15
 of 52.3 c/KWh in 2011 (Eskom, 2011b), the 
                                                 
13
 An example for fuel switching would be a switch from paraffin, wood or charcoal towards the use of 
electricity for individual household energy consumption.  
14
 Measured in real 1999 ZAR.  
15
 The average standard price is the average price over different tariffs Eskom offers to different market 
segments and includes generation, transmission and distribution. 
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inclusion of these external costs would increase the electricity price considerably under the 
central and high estimates as depicted by figure 10.  
Figure 10: Quantification of coal-related externalities in domestic studies 
 
 Source: Own illustration based (Eskom, 2011b, Spalding-Fecher and Matibe, 2003). 
From that perspective, an aggregated consideration of externalities from a country’s aging 
power fleet is not meaningful to channel investments into preferable technologies from that 
perspective. Consequently, externalities have to be evaluated individually for new power 
stations and for each technology. As external costs come on top of the costs paid by a 
power producer and thus affect the final price paid by the consumer, one should look at 
electricity prices first in South Africa.  
2.2.4 Electricity prices 
Due to the monopolistic market structure in South Africa, electricity prices are not 
determined via the market mechanism. To limit possible monopoly rents from situations 
where Eskom reduces its output and charges a higher price than in equilibrium, electricity 
prices in South Africa are subject to approval by the NERSA. For that matter, NERSA’s 
goal is to ensure cost-reflective pricing. Therefore, Eskom forecasts output and costs and 
submits an ‘allowed revenues application’ to NERSA. A process of pubic consultation 
helps to adjust the average standard price and the way it should increase. This mechanism 
is called Multi-Year Price Determination (MYPD). If forecasts prove to be inaccurate, 
Eskom can apply for further adjustments of the agreed tariff at the beginning of each new 
fiscal year. The application has to be based on updated sales and cost projections. During 
MYPD3 for example, a yearly price increase of 8% was approved. Eskom is allowed to 
cover its full cost, plus a “reasonable margin or return”. This is defined in the Electricity 
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Regulation Act No. 4 (2006). While the allowed margin was not specified in the Act, 
NERSA approved returns ranging between 14.1 to 16.2% of total allowed revenues under 
MYPD3 (NERSA, 2013b).  
Over the last decade Eskom charged among the lowest prices for electricity in the world 
(Spalding-Fecher and Matibe, 2003). Although nominal prices increased every year, real 
prices have been kept relatively stable up until 2007. Since then, real prices increased by 
factor of 2 to account for rising costs of electricity generation, which is highlighted in 
figure 11. 
Figure 11: Development of average standard electricity price in nominal and real prices 
 
 Source: Illustration16 adapted from (OECD, 2013, Eskom, 2012g, NERSA, 2013b). 
This real price increase ultimately reflects the politically wanted transition towards a cost-
reflective electricity price in South Africa (Creamer, 2013a). Even though Eskom’s 
average purchase price for coal is still 80% below the South African export price (OECD, 
2013), McKay (2012) confirms that increasing coal prices drive the cost for electricity 
production upwards. This happens because many long-term supply contracts from Eskom 
are expiring in the next years, while the price negotiation position of mining companies 
improves with rising coal export prices. Other important price drivers were identified by 
Eskom’s CEO Dames (2012) with a maintenance and investment backlog, which puts the 
system under pressure and makes unplanned power outages more likely and maintenance 
more costly. Also, anticipation of an introduction of a carbon tax in South Africa leads to 
early price adjustments (Treasury Department, 2010).
17
  
                                                 
16
 Note: Figures after 2004 based on Eskom financial year from 1 April to 31 March. 
17
 An example for such a price adjustment is the inclusion of an environmental levy of 3.5 c/KWh for 
electricity generated from non-renewable sources.  
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Technically, electricity prices charged in South Africa consist of several components. Nel 
(2012) decomposed them in variable costs (KWhs consumed), fixed costs (network access 
and metering), levies (electrification and rural subsidy, environmental levy) and taxes 
(VAT). During the financial year 2013/14, the average standard electricity price was 
approved at 65.51 c/KWh. As illustrated in table 3, this price will increase to 89.13 c/KWh 
in 2017/18.  
Table 3: Allowed revenues, standard average prices and percentage price increases 
Financial Year Allowed revenues from 
tariff-based sales (mZAR) 
Forecast sales to tariff 
customers (GWh) 
Standard average 
price (c/KWh) 
Percentage price 
increase (%) 
2013/14 142746 217890 65.51 8.0 
2014/15 155477 219744 70.75 8.0 
2015/16 171838 224877 76.41 8.0 
2016/17 189396 229495 82.53 8.0 
2017/18 209025 234519 89.13 8.0 
 Source: (NERSA, 2013b). 
If compared internationally (Eskom, 2012d), the standard average price in South Africa 
was still at a very low level in 2010, and the OECD (2013) claims that it is still below 
Eskom’s marginal costs of generation. Eskom (2013f), on the other hand, reported total 
generation costs
18
 of 51 c/KWh in 2013, while admitting that the standard average price 
was not cost-reflective. So far, the government’s target of a cost-reflective electricity price 
has not been reached and current standard average prices still do not cover all direct costs 
of electricity generation.  
2.2.5 Access to power 
Access to power depends on the availability of two factors: physical electricity generation 
and a means of transport of that electricity to the point of use. The aspects of transport are 
relevant for the producers and for the consumers’ point of view.   
Access to power is a very important and topical subject in South Africa. Given the size of 
the country and the concentration of power generation in the Mpumalanga region, power is 
transported through a national transmission grid and regional distribution grids. Although 
Bazilian et al. (2012) confirm that the electrification rate is by far the highest for a Sub-
Saharan Africa country, there is still a considerable way to go before universal access is 
realized with 82.7% of South African households having a grid connection in 2011 
(StatsSA, 2012a). This electrification gap stems essentially from the country’s socio-
                                                 
18
 Excluding transmission and distribution.  
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political history, where access to electricity was mainly a privilege for the white 
population. As Bekker et al. (2008) point out, electricity distribution was the responsibility 
of local authorities during the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, there was not much drive 
behind building new grid connections, due to limited financial capabilities especially of 
poorer municipalities. However, this has changed over the past 20 years with the 
introduction of the Integrated National Electrification Programme (INEP). Since 1991, 
about 4.2 million additional households have been connected (Eskom, 2013f). By 2014, the 
government aims at a electrification rate of 92% (GCIS, 2011).  
In addition to the installation of new grid connections for households, two other initiatives 
were brought forward to improve universal access to energy in South Africa: a solar water 
heating program and an off-grid PV program with solar home systems (SHS). The solar 
water heating program was rolled out by Eskom to provide warm water to disadvantaged 
households, being identified as a very efficient means of energy provision. According to 
Zuma (2013), 315,000 solar water geysers have been distributed by early 2013. The SHS 
program was introduced in 1999 with the aim to reach households that were located 
uneconomically far away from a regional distribution grid. The performance of this 
program was evaluated both by Lemaire (2011) and Wlokas (2011) and each of them 
confirmed considerable improvements for the rural population despite the many barriers 
the program faced. These included a skills shortage in rural areas and lacking financial 
resources of the rural population to pay a contribution to the SHS. Another important 
mental barrier that the already disadvantaged citizen faced was identified by Niez (2010) in 
their misconception that renewable energy meant rural energy and was of a lower value.  
In a broader context, South Africa’s access to power is also secured through the 
participation in the SAPP market. Potential large-scale projects such as the Grand Inga 
Dam in the Democratic Republic of Congo could also increase the long-term access to 
power and security of supply (Rosnes and Vennemo, 2012).  
2.3 Future policy plans 
With regard to South Africa’s energy planning, there are several topics that are currently 
discussed and that could considerably influence the costs of different technologies. These 
include, inter alia, South Africa’s role in global GHG abatement, new economic tools of 
pricing externalities such as a recently discussed carbon tax, plans for rural development 
and a general transition of the industry to a less carbon-intensive structure.   
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South Africa’s role in global GHG abatement 
Compared with other emerging economies (c.f. Figure 8), South Africa has relatively high 
emissions of GHG, both in emissions per capita an in total terms. About 80% of all 
emissions in South Africa originate from the energy supply sector with half of it being 
released from the ESI (Government of South Africa, 2011). To limit the impact of 
emissions and to take on a credible role in global climate change abatement, South Africa 
committed to restrain their growth at the COP15 UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen in 2009. As with other emerging economies, the difficulty for policy makers 
in South Africa is to balance a reduction of emissions from the energy supply industry with 
an increasing hunger for energy driven by prospects of economic growth and poverty 
alleviation (Ojha, 2005). For that matter, South Africa agreed on limiting its total 
emissions by 42% relative to a ‘Business As Usual’ (BAU) scenario until 2025. This is a 
scenario, where emissions are growing under the assumption of no negative impact on 
climate and ecosystem. The BAU scenario itself is defined by an upper and lower bound. 
Therefore, a 42% reduction relative to the upper bound of the BAU scenario would still 
translate to an allowed absolute increase of emissions from 457 Mt to more than 620 Mt of 
CO2-equivalent by 2025, compared with 2010 levels (IEA, 2012a). In addition, the 
commitment is conditional on transfer of technology and financial resources from Annex I 
countries as defined in the Kyoto protocol (OECD, 2013). However, the OECD (2013) is 
skeptical towards the political willingness to implement measures that actually facilitate 
achievement of the committed emission path. Rafey and Sovacool (2011) confirmed that 
the technology mix as envisaged in the current IRP is seen as far too carbon-intensive with 
an over-allocation on coal-fired power plants and that a main contribution for emission 
reductions must come from sectors other than energy generation if targets are to be 
reached.  
Introduction of a carbon tax  
One policy instrument to include externalities from carbon emissions into the market price 
for electricity is the introduction of a carbon tax. With such a tax, a certain amount of 
money has to be paid for each unit of CO2 emitted. In that way, the Treasury Department 
(2010) claims, “lower emissions, greater energy efficiency and the use of cleaner, low 
carbon technologies” will be triggered in the ESI. The political challenge is to design a 
carbon tax in a way such that it is equal to marginal external damage costs from GHG 
emissions in the long-run, while confronting affected sectors immediately with the full 
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price could make them uncompetitive on international markets (Government of South 
Africa, 2011). The best way to avoid this is believed to be an increasing tax rate, starting 
from a relatively low level. Vorster et al. (2011) have modeled different carbon prices to 
find such an optimal tax rate. They found that a gradually increasing tax rate, starting from 
100 ZAR/tCO2-eq. and gradually increasing to 750 ZAR over the next four decades would 
be most efficient. Their calculations reveal annual potential savings of 600Mt of CO2-
equivalents by 2050 based on the carbon tax. As outlined in the National Treasury’s 
Budget Review (2012), a carbon tax is likely to be introduced in 2013. A starting price of 
120 ZAR per ton of CO2–equivalent is expected with annual increases of 10% until 2020. 
It is also expected that 60% of all sectors will have their pollution excluded from tax 
liability to smoothen the immediate burden to vulnerable sectors. Thus, Winkler (2012) 
estimates the effective tax rate to be reduced to 48 ZAR/tCO2-eq.. Newbery and Eberhard 
(2008) have pointed out that Eskom is already factoring-in a shadow-price for its CO2 
emissions, which equals 50% of the price set in the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS), in order to smoothen the transition to a tax regime.  
Development of rural areas 
In South Africa, there is still a big difference in terms of development between rural and 
urban areas. When it comes to access to electricity, about 3.4 million households are not 
yet connected to the electricity grid. Table 4 gives an overview of the electrification 
situation in 2009: 
Table 4: Electrification rate in South Africa in 2009 
Province Total Number of Households Backlog Households not electrified 
Western Cape 1,333,886 191,366 14% 
Northern Cape 272,958 50,405 18% 
North West  914,070 196,605 22% 
Gauteng 3,127,991 740,569 24% 
Free State 823,972 201,919 25% 
Mpumalanga 879,082 231,485 26% 
Limpopo 1,250,716 329,440 26% 
Kwa Zulu-Natal 2,405,165 818,708 34% 
Eastern Cape 1,667,435 669,421 40% 
Total 12,675,275 3,429,918 25% 
 Source:Adapted from Niez (2010). 
One problem identified by Niez (2010) is that about half of the disadvantaged households 
are situated in informal dwellings that cannot be economically electrified. She clarifies that 
before these households can be electrified, the residents must either move to formal 
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dwellings or their dwelling must be formalized, so that the provided public infrastructure is 
preserved from storms. Thus, the main efforts from the government will be in a better 
development of informal dwellings and rural areas. In his ‘State of the Nation Address 
2013’, president Zuma (2013) announced increased activity in rural development. Inter 
alia, he promised fast-tracked work during the next two years in the North West, a region 
that lags behind in the provision of basic services. Other initiatives will contain 28 
renewable energy projects in the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Northern Cape and the Free 
State and the set-up of new transmission lines. One example for increasing investments in 
rural areas is a CSP project to be built in Upington in the Northern Cape.    
Transition of the ESI 
The last important aspect that will be guided by future policies concerns the transition of 
the industry. Energy planning in the IRP is an iterative process, were both latest market 
data and contributions from the scientific community are included in the revisions of the 
IRP policy document. One factor that is subject to change over time is future energy 
demand. Nel (2012) argues that energy demand is driven by changing energy intensity 
ratios and economic growth of an economy. Thus, changes in the structure of the economy, 
for instance a further shift towards the tertiary sector, play an important role for policy 
development and provide benefits that attenuate pressures from economic growth. Nel 
(2012) identified such benefits in a reduction of the carbon intensity from South Africa’s 
shift to the tertiary sector, from time gains for investment decisions, from reduced 
exposure to fuel price volatility and from better access to international carbon-sensitive 
markets. Other parameters that will change in coming IRP iterations are the LCOE for 
different generation technologies. These depend on global learning rates, technological 
breakthroughs, price developments for capital and commodities and on external shocks, 
such as the Fukushima accident has shown for nuclear technology, when risks must be 
reevaluated. Thus, it is easy to understand that policies and political targets concerning a 
transition of the ESI are not always straightforward in South Africa.  
If the market structure of the ESI is implemented as envisaged in the ISMO draft bill, the 
transition towards a more open market for IPPs could lead to a re-allocation of assets. In 
this case, (Maleka et al., 2010) expect that some of Eskom’s power stations will be sold to 
IPPs. In addition, new questions about managing the intermittency and dispatchability of 
technologies will arise at the time when the planned 17.8 GW of new RES are to be 
integrated in the national grid. Then, it would indeed be better to have a neutral ISMO, 
40 
 
which is also acknowledged by Nel (2012). At the level of individual power plants, the 
completion of the two base-load coal power plants Medupi and Kusile will add new 
capacity of 9564 MW and equally increase the carbon budget of the country. From this, it 
is likely that other zero-emission technologies will become more popular in energy 
planning to offset increasing carbon emissions, which might include nuclear and natural 
gas. Nuclear new-builds account for 9.6 GW in the current IRP (2010) and they are 
currently scheduled to be brought online by 2029. However, a site assessment report from 
February 2013 is being held from the public and doubts about the capacity of the country 
to build out such capacity were expressed by (Goldman, in Blackman, 2012). Thus, policy 
changes in this sense are possible and the release of the next revised IRP will show more 
about this option. In addition, the outcome of explorations and the political willingness to 
harness shale gas might have the potential to transform the ESI towards a less carbon-
intensive path (Creamer, 2013b). Though, besides existing environmental concerns, the net 
energetic balance has to be taken into account when evaluating the attractiveness of the 
fracturing technology.  
These four areas policies discussion are important and dynamic factors that may influence 
the conditions under which technologies are to be evaluated. Consequently, they must be 
accounted for when developing a framework for an evaluation of different generation 
technologies. This framework will be developed in the next chapter.   
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3. Research Methods 
This chapter on research methods refers to the second sub-objective defined for this thesis, 
which was to introduce and evaluate critically the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) 
framework, to elaborate its shortfalls and to develop a comprehensive framework that 
allows comparing potential electricity generation technologies for South Africa on a 
common basis. The usefulness of this approach is justified by Fakir (2012) who has called 
for a new normative framework for energy planning in South Africa, that is governed by 
the following parameters: “social outcomes, reducing carbon intensity, getting more from 
limited finances, accounting for externalities, ensuring long-term flexible energy security 
and diversifying the industrial base”. 
Consequently, the goal of this chapter is to develop a multi-dimensional framework for an 
economic evaluation of electricity supply options in South Africa. The parameters Fakir 
(2012) called for will guide the elements contained in the framework too. However, to 
keep the scope focused throughout this work, main emphasis will be put on the key 
aspects.  
First, the LCOE methodology, a method to measure direct costs of electricity generation, 
will be introduced and formalized and subsequently its shortfalls will be pointed out. Then, 
non-market priced cost elements, namely externalities from electricity generation will be 
discussed and an approach will be developed to incorporate them into the standard LCOE 
analysis. This will be complemented with a quantification of risks with nuclear energy 
generation, being the only technology that is exposed to a higher risk class, proven by the 
fact that these risks cannot be fully insured on the market. Moreover, non-quantifiable 
aspects of energy resource planning will be discussed for each technology. This includes 
the aspects of job creation potential, availability of electricity, and energy security. Finally, 
a combined approach will be formalized, putting all monetary and non-monetary 
dimensions together. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the limitations with regard 
to the methodology developed.  
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3.1 Direct costs of electricity generation 
3.1.1 Levelized Cost of Electricity 
The LCOE methodology is a practical tool for economic evaluation of power generation 
investments and it represents the most transparent framework currently in use for energy 
planning and policy development (IEA/NEA/OECD, 2010). The clear advantage of this 
approach is that it allows for comparison of investments that differ in physical principles, 
fuel types or their economic plant life. When calculating the LCOE of a power plant 
project, all discounted direct project costs over the life-time of the project are divided by 
the discounted sum of the electricity that it generates over its life-time. From a financial 
perspective, LCOE can also be described as the constant level of revenues necessary per 
year to recover all expenses over the life of a power plant (Roth and Ambs, 2004, NREL, 
2010). In the standard approach, these expenses include plant costs, operation & 
maintenance costs (O&M), and fuel costs. In the end, the calculation will allow for a 
comparison between different options on a constant unit cost basis, in this thesis in ZAR 
per MWh.  
In practice, two approaches to calculate LCOE have evolved: the simplified LCOE 
approach (sLCOE) and the Financial Model Approach (FMA). These differ in that the 
sLCOE approach gives “the minimum price at which energy must be sold for an energy 
project to break even (or have present value of zero)” while the FMA “solves for the 
required revenues to achieve a certain internal rate of return” of a specific investor (Black 
and Veatch, 2011). This internal rate of return is based on company-specific project 
discount rates, tax liability, financing costs and revenue requirements. The FMA is thus 
preferable for integrated companies that might have to take internal investment decisions 
between several technologies. The sLCOE approach, at the other hand, is preferable to 
policy makers, as it makes projects comparable without accounting for specific 
requirements that might vary from company to company and thus a single discount rate for 
all projects is applied. For these reasons and also because company specific data are 
difficult to obtain for outsiders, the latter approach will be used throughout this thesis. 
Subsequently, when referred to LCOE, it is the sLCOE approach that is meant. 
To calculate the LCOE of a project, capital costs, O&M costs and fuel costs have to be 
levelized over the life-time of the power plant. Subsequently, these three cost components 
will be reviewed separately and then combined into a complete LCOE formula.  
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Plant costs (cp) are defined as the costs that occur to set up the power plant. Often, for such 
analysis, the concept of overnight costs is applied, which simulates the case where the 
costs to install the plant occur ‘overnight’ following the investment, and the plant is ready 
to operate straight after the investment. Regularly, such data is available in the form of 
currency per unit of capacity. As all costs have to be levelized on a unit of electricity 
output, e.g. in ZAR/MWh, plant costs are divided by the time the power plant actually 
produces electricity in a year. This is given by the 8760 hours of a year (H), which are 
multiplied by a capacity factor (f), indicating the percentage of the time the power plant 
actually produces electricity. So far, this calculation gives capital costs per unit of 
electricity over one year. In reality, a power plant operates over years or even decades. 
This is why a capital recovery factor (CRF) has to be included in the calculation. This CRF 
is known as the annuity factor in finance and here defined as the portion of plant cost that 
the revenues must cover during a year of operation to break the whole project even at the 
end of the plant life. The CRF thus converts a flow of annual payments over a project life 
into a present value. It depends on the discount rate (r) applied to the project and plant 
operation time (T). Capital costs can be calculated with the following formula: 
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The second component in LCOE is O&M costs. O&M costs occur during the operation of 
a power plant and can either be expressed in fix (cfom) or variable (cvom) terms. This 
depends on the data available. Like capital costs, fixed O&M costs are divided by the 
multiplier of H and f to see how much of them occur during one year of production. What 
is different though is that O&M costs can be subject to increase with growing plant age, 
caused by technical degradation. Consequently, the sum of fixed and variable O&M costs 
is multiplied with a levelization factor (l). This l levelizes all O&M costs over plant life 
and accounts for possible cost increases by incorporating a price escalation rate (e). By 
considering a discount rate (r) and project life time (T), everything is expressed in net 
present values.  
          [  (
    
   
      )] 
44 
 
         
        
        
 
     
     
 [  (
   
   
)
 
] 
The third component in LCOE is fuel costs (cf). These costs do only exist with 
technologies, where fuel is physically needed to produce electricity. It is thus an important 
price factor for fossil-based power plants while negligible for most RES. As with O&M 
costs, fuel prices are mostly subject to variation over time and consequently, current price 
levels have to be multiplied with a separate levelization factor for fuel. The formula for 
fuel costs looks as follows: 
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Including all cost components, the full LCOE formula is then: 
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3.1.2 Underlying assumptions 
The analysis of LCOE always depends on assumptions about price escalation rates and 
discount rates. Most often, such estimates are based on historical data and thus projections 
of their future developments always include a level of uncertainty. As the IPCC (2011) 
clarifies, e and r cannot be observed directly, thus assumptions about future real rates must 
rely on expectations about inflation and price developments. This is why LCOE are often 
indicated as a range, based on upper-bound and lower-bound levels for r and/or for e. To 
account for this, a sensitivity analysis with regard to different levels of r will be provided 
in chapter 4.2. 
It is also important to make clear whether r and e are expressed in constant real terms, 
excluding effects of inflation, or in constant nominal terms, as a stream of values in 
nominal currency, including inflation (Black and Veatch, 2011). For the scope of this 
thesis, constant real rates, adjusted for inflation, will be applied and results will thus be 
expressed as ‘real LCOE in 2012 ZAR currency’.  
In addition and according to Steyn (2006), discount rates are insofar subject to debate as it 
is not clear whether they should reflect private risk faced by a monopolist or whether social 
discount rates should be applied. They would be much lower and in the order of 4-5%, as 
Griffin (2009) suggests. Especially if high costs arise in the future, the choice of a higher 
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discount rate may considerably affect the LCOE in favor of technologies where high costs 
arise in the future (IPCC, 2011). In the scope of this thesis, all cost calculations in chapter 
4 will be discounted with 5%. The separate sensitivity analysis will make variations of the 
results from other discount rates visible.  
Finally, it must also be noted that LCOE depend on the location of the power plant project 
to be evaluated. The capacity factor is a technical performance parameter that strongly 
depends on location, especially in the case of RES. Other technology-dependent 
parameters such as life-time, investment cost and O&M cost might also depend on local 
market conditions, wages and maturity of technology (IPCC, 2011). In the analysis, best 
available locations will be selected for energy projects and consequently, optimistic 
parameters will be applied. Economically, it makes sense to choose these locations first.   
3.1.3 Flaws 
LCOE is a good and practical approach to compare costs of different energy technologies 
on a common basis, but it comes with several serious flaws that limit the significance of 
the results for reality. In the standard approach, Roth and Ambs (2004) criticize that only 
costs directly associated to the plant-level are taken into account for economic evaluation, 
while indirect costs are deprived from entering the equation.  
As confirmed by the IPCC (2011), indirect costs miss out in the calculation of LCOE and 
must thus be thought about separately in a consideration of the competitiveness of a power 
plant. In the electricity sector, the list of such indirect costs is long and includes, inter alia, 
externalities (e.g. carbon price mark-up, pollution, or health costs), cost for back-up power 
that stems from the intermittency of some RES, grid integration and transmission costs, 
system cost increase from a change of the energy mix, outages of base-load power plants 
due to maintenance, and path dependence which refers to sunk costs from given 
investments.  
Another flaw in the LCOE methodology is the fact that some direct cost occur far in the 
future, such as decommissioning costs of a power plant or waste disposal, and are often not 
included with the argument that given high discount rates, they do not have a significant 
effect on LCOE anyway (OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010). 
In his concept of a smart energy policy, Griffin (2009) called upon emerging economies to 
question their willingness to pay for clean and secure energy. Consequently, evaluations of 
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investments in the electricity sector must include the externalities, risks and other problem 
areas described above to reflect the true willingness to pay and to avoid miss-allocations, 
as Vorster et al. (2011) acknowledge. A framework including indirect costs and non-
monetary aspects of energy planning will be developed below and included to the LCOE 
methodology in order to provide more realistic prices as decision criteria for energy 
planning in South Africa.  
3.2 Indirect costs of electricity generation 
3.2.1 Economic reasoning behind an inclusion of externalities into full costs 
The quantification of externalities and their inclusion into market prices for electricity is 
not a new concept and various studies exist, that have tried to quantify externalities 
occurring with electricity production. Surprisingly, only few of the studies have been 
directly combined with the concept of LCOE and to the knowledge of the author, no such 
combined analysis has been published recently for the case of South Africa. Blignaut 
(2002) advocated that the downside of a non-inclusion of external costs into market prices 
is a long-term miss-allocation of resources and this has occurred for the benefits of coal in 
South Africa, as the Treasury Department (2010) confirms. The economic reasoning 
behind this situation is simplified in Figure 11.  
Figure 12: Electricity market allocation with private and social marginal costs 
 
 Source: Own illustration, adopted from Blignaut and King (2002). 
Here, the case is depicted where an electricity supplier sells an additional unit of electricity 
produced from coal at his marginal private cost (MCp). In equilibrium, this leads to the 
quantity of Qm demanded at price Pm. However, the true costs that society faces include 
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externalities from burning the coal and are higher than MCp. They are depicted by the 
marginal social cost (MCs). Thus, the equilibrium including externalities is at a higher price 
P* and a lower quantity Q*. What can be concluded from this situation is that either the 
electricity price without externalities is too low (Pm < P*) or the quantity of electricity 
demanded is too high (Qm > Q*). Blignaut and King (2002) acquiesce that it is also an 
indication for too much externalities produced and for too few incentives that exist to 
reduce them. To correct for the root of this market failure, it makes sense to force the 
electricity supplier to include the externalities into his pricing function.  
3.2.2 Externalities studies for South Africa 
A meta-study on externalities from the South African electricity sector was compiled by 
Edkins et al. (2010c) with the aim that this study be included in the next revision of the 
IRP. It summarizes the research published in previous reports from Dutkiewicz and De 
Villiers, Van Horen (1997) and Spalding-Fecher and Matibe (2003) and is thus the best 
local source of data available. The study comprises all technologies used in South Africa, 
including coal, nuclear, CCGT-gas, OCGT-diesel, biomass, small hydro, wind, CSP and 
PV. In their study, the authors identified both negative and positive externalities. Negative 
externalities cover impacts from the entire life-cycle of a power plant, reaching from 
construction, manufacturing activities, utilization of the plant, fuel production, transport 
and utilization, to waste management, while positive externalities include avoided health 
costs from increased access to electricity. Unfortunately, these benefits from electrification 
were reported Edkins et al. as a uniform value for all technologies per customer electrified. 
As a result, relative prices between technologies are not affected by this number and for 
this reason it will be excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, it would only make sense to 
include these positive impacts from electrification as long as there are still households left 
to electrify. As soon as a 100% electrification rate is reached, it would not make any 
economic sense to account for these benefits over the rest of a plant’s life-time.  
Impacts from climate change and outdoor air pollution were identified to be the most 
important drivers that influence negative external costs from coal-based electricity 
generation. This finding was confirmed in a separate international study from Nicholson et 
al. (2011). However, Edkins et al. (2010c) admitted that damage costs from GHG 
emissions seem to be outdated in their local meta-study, if compared with international 
studies. They also added that international studies out-costed local studies on health 
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impacts from acid mine drainage by a factor of 10. Finally, they acknowledged that their 
meta-study had been compiled under severe time pressure. Consequently, values for 
damage costs from emissions and for negative impacts from coal mining will be sourced 
from international studies.  
A detailed externality study for the new Kusile coal-based power plant has been published 
by Blignaut et al. (2011). This study achieved to overcome the flaws of previous studies in 
terms of evaluating global damage costs for GHG emissions and health impacts. It 
incorporates the latest scientific consensus on these issues. Their externality estimates for 
coal power plants will therefore be applied in this analysis. For all other technologies, 
results from the local meta-study will be used. Where this one is flawed, as described 
above, the data-transfer method will be applied and estimates will be adopted from recent 
international studies.  
3.2.3 Data-transfer method from international studies 
In order to estimate external costs from GHG emissions (EXGHG) as accurately as possible 
in this research, estimates for damage costs from GHG emissions (DCGHG) are adopted 
from recent international peer-reviewed publications. These are multiplied with emission 
intensity factors of a technology (EIrt), if no concrete estimates on GHG output for a 
specific reference plant are available.  
      [          ] 
To make data transfer meaningful, Nahman (2011) suggests that values for local pollution 
impacts based on estimates from other countries have to be adjusted simultaneously for 
relative income differences between countries and preferences for local environmental 
quality by using the following formula: 
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where (ĒSA) is the estimated value for South Africa, (EBC) is the estimated value for the 
benchmark country, (ISA) and (IBC) are the per capita incomes based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP) rates and (Q) is the income elasticity for environmental quality.  
Finally, external costs are added up and included into LCOE. Technically, this is 
straightforward if all data is provided on a per-unit basis (ZAR/KWh) as in the given 
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studies. In the same way like variable O&M costs, net externalities (EXnet) will then be 
multiplied by a levelization factor l and added on top of the LCOE:  
                        [       ] 
The difficulty which arises is to determine a reasonable value for l that reflects the cost 
development of externalities of the plant life. The smallest value that could be assumed for 
l is the inflation rate, but as all calculations in this analysis are based on real values, 
inflation will be factored out. An assumption for l would then be a value of one for reasons 
of simplicity.  
To account for uncertainties with the quantification of externalities, lower-, median- and 
upper-bound values will be reported, consistent with the LCOE methodology. Where 
prices are available in foreign currency or real values based on a specific base year, they 
will be converted to ZAR in the base pricing year of the source and then inflated with the 
South African producer price index (PPI) to standardized 2012 real values.   
3.2.4 Risk  
As planned by the DoE (2010) in the last IRP iteration, South African policy makers 
currently face a decision situation concerning an upgrade of the country’s nuclear fleet by 
9.6 GW of new capacity, which is targeted to be brought online until 2029. However, the 
deployment of this technology induces profound risks. Yet, the possibility of major 
accidents, as well as long-term management issues of waste treatment remain 
controversially discussed issues (OECD/NEA, 2003). Even though probabilities of major 
accidents seem to be very small, a second major accident happened in 2011 in Japan. This 
accident has shown that consequences from situations out of control can be immense and 
costly and are in great part borne by the society at large. In a responsible energy planning, 
it is thus an imperative to include the risks associated with this technology into its 
economic evaluation. In this sense, a risk premium for the costs of a major nuclear accident 
must added to the LCOE for nuclear power, in addition to other external costs from its fuel 
cycle. This is indeed almost an impossible task, given potentially high external costs and 
low probabilities for a major accident. Only two scientific studies from Rabl and Rabl 
(2013) and Meyer (2012) are available, who have both tried to quantify the costs resulting 
from nuclear accidents based on experiences from the Chernobyl and Fukushima cases. As 
with other externalities studies, lower-, upper- and central-bound scenarios are reported 
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and these will be included in the full-cost evaluation of nuclear power in South Africa. 
However, the assumptions made in these studies can be subject debate and their relevance 
for the case of South Africa will be discussed in the analysis part on nuclear energy, in 
chapter 4.1.2.  
Apart from quantifiable direct and indirect costs of electricity generation, there are also 
non-monetary aspects that must be evaluated during integrated resource planning. 
Qualitative and quantitative methods to do so will be described in the following chapters.       
3.3 Non-monetary aspects of integrated resource planning 
3.3.1 Job creation potential 
Job creation from a diversification of the industrial base is a macro-economic factor with 
special importance for emerging economies such as South Africa, where many people have 
to struggle to participate in economic development. Even if job creation potential is hard to 
quantify in numbers, it is still a valid qualitative and social aspect for policy makers in 
their decisions concerning the IRP for the electricity sector (DoE, 2010). In theory, new 
jobs can arise from investments into any new energy technology. Maia et al. (2011) allude 
that existing jobs can be lost if the capacity of one technology is substituted with that of 
another. At this point, it should be recalled to the reader’s mind that South Africa has 
committed itself to reduce its future GHG emissions compared to a baseline emissions 
scenario and conditional on transfer of technology from developed countries. Such a 
transfer of technology, as Pegels (2012) argues, will induce a shift of the ESI towards new 
‘green’ industries and ultimately the creation of new jobs. From a policy maker’s 
perspective, the relevance with this is that job creation is only valuable, if local companies 
and human capital are involved in a changing value chain of South Africa’s ESI.  
The effects of different energy technologies (t) on job creation have been subject to 
research. Recently, South Africa-specific estimates about the job creation potential of 
different energy technologies have been published in reports from Edkins et al. (2010b), 
Van Wyk et al. (2011) and  Maia et al. (2011). Even though differences in the underlying 
methodology for their projections exist, all of these studies have in common that they 
consistently specify the job creation potential from various sub-categories such as 
construction (Jc,t), manufacturing (Jmf,t), installation (Jin,t), operation (Jo,t), maintenance 
51 
 
(Jmn,t) and fuel processing (Jfp,t). The sum of these (∑Ji,t) gives the total job creation 
potential of a technology and is reported in jobs created per MW of installed capacity. 
In the analysis part, best estimates for the job creation potential (JCPt) of each technology 
will be drawn based on the arithmetic mean of the results from these studies. This will 
allow for a comparison of the relative job creation potential between technologies: 
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3.3.2 Availability of electricity 
Electricity is a good that has to be consumed instantly if it is not stored in another medium. 
For this reason the concept of availability of electricity becomes another important aspect 
in a non-monetary evaluation of different generation technologies. Usually, electricity 
demand is not constant during a day, but depends on how many electric appliances are 
turned on at a moment. A typical daily demand profile for electricity in South Africa from 
2012 is depicted by Figure 13. It must be noted that this demand profile is not identical 
over time, but seasonal and week-day varieties in demand patterns exist. However, for the 
scope of this analysis, this typical demand curve will be used for reasoning.     
Figure 13: Sketch of typical hourly electricity demand patterns in 2012 
 
Source: Illustration adapted from (Eskom, 2009a, Eskom, 2013h, Sigauke and Chikobvu, 2012). 
The electricity load that is put on the system to match demand comes from various energy 
sources and must be predicted in advance, and the required output of power stations must 
be planned and dispatched accordingly (Sigauke and Chikobvu, 2011). While base load 
and intermediate load are relatively easy to predict and provide, peak load must be 
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produced from very flexible power stations that are able to adjust their output instantly. In 
South Africa this is currently done with OCGT or pumped-storage hydro technology, but 
the situation will change if more renewable energy capacity will be connected to the grid. 
Then, it is important to assess the degrees of dispatchability and back-up power 
capabilities, which are expressed by capacity factors, and the flexibility to adapt power 
output. These aspects will be discussed qualitatively in the analysis chapter. More complex 
discussions such as the market value of variable RES based on merit-order-effects or 
correlation effects, as for example suggested by Hirth (2012) will not be covered here. 
Such analysis would only be meaningful in a competitive market were market forces 
influence relative prices, which is not given in the case of South Africa as Sigauke and 
Chikobvu (2011) advocate.    
3.3.3 Energy security 
Energy security is one of three pillars of a smart energy policy as defined by Griffin (2009) 
and it has played a leading role for previous energy investment decisions in South Africa. 
Politicians have regularly called upon energy security as the main justification to upgrade 
coal power capacity or to justify investments into the domestic coal-to-liquid (CTL) 
industry. Rafey and Sovacool (2011) stipulate that such reasoning was legitimate, if one 
interprets the concepts of energy security and climate change with local reference to the 
South African history, market and stakeholders. However, the country is progressing and 
the issue of global climate change imposes new responsibilities on emerging countries to 
reconsider their concepts of energy security.  
In this sense, Sovacool and Mukherjee (2011) have defined energy security as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon consisting of availability, affordability, efficiency, technology 
development, sustainability and regulatory aspects of energy. An evaluation of a 
technology and its potential to contribute to energy security must thus include a 
consideration of these aspects. To quantify such aspects, the authors established an 
exhaustive list of indicators over six dimensions, but admit that selecting a few of them 
might be sufficient for a reasonable evaluation. Even though their framework was 
developed to compare energy security between different countries, indicators that allow for 
a comparison between technologies can be found. In the underlying case, this could be the 
following indicators in table 5: 
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Table 5: Selected indicators and metrics for measurement of energy security dimensions 
Dimension Indicator Metric 
Availability Proven recoverable energy reserves, 
Total renewable energy resource endowment 
Reserves-to-production ratio in years, 
resource endowment in GW 
Affordability Social marginal cost of electricity generation ZAR/KWh 
Efficiency Energy end-use efficiency η, percentage of energy input to output 
Technology Development Lead time for construction of power plant Years 
Sustainability Energy payback ratio Number 
Sources: Adapted for technology comparison from (Sovacool and Mukherjee, 2011). 
3.4 A combined approach / framework 
The final and comprehensive approach to evaluate all technology options will consist of a 
combined monetary evaluation and qualitative discussion as outlined in the previous 
chapters. LCOE, externalities and risks will be added and levelized on a per-unit basis of 
electricity output. Job creation potential and energy security will be measured with the 
metrics introduced, while the availability will be discussed qualitatively. For all 
calculations, lower, central and upper bound estimates will be made where appropriate. In 
a summary statistics chapter, all technologies will then be compared directly with each 
other and the sensitivity to variations in important input factors will be analyzed.  
3.5 Limitations 
The methodology developed claims by no means to be exhaustive, given the many aspects 
that play a role in energy resource planning. Besides, parameters that underlie calculations 
and qualitative evaluations might be subject to controversy. One important example is the 
choice of an appropriate discount rate which reflects the diminishing value attributed to 
future cash flows. This choice is especially important when costs occur very far in the 
future. However, such ethical discussions will not be included here, but it must be noted 
that different schools of thought were expressed by economists such as Stern (2006), 
Weitzman (2010), or Nordhaus (2008). To account for possible differences in outcomes 
from the selection of discount rates, a sensitivity analysis with regard to this parameter is 
provided in chapter 4.2.2.  
Other issues that might limit the validity of the results are availability and quality of data 
for South Africa. Much of the data is provided through Eskom, a company that is 
ultimately controlled by the government and possible biases towards certain technologies 
that seem most profitable might at least be imaginable. Over and above, some of the 
calculations that rely on previous studies might be subject to mistakes or impreciseness 
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given that the data-transfer method is applied and mistakes that occurred in previous 
studies are consequently incorporated into this analysis. The same issue applies to analysis 
of externalities of RES which are partially based on international data, transformed to local 
circumstances. Thopil and Anastassios (2010) advocate, that accurate analysis can only be 
performed ex-post, once RES are installed and in operation. 
Calculations of projections might be of limited reliability, when these are based on 
historical events. Consequently, there is no guaranteed certainty that inferences about the 
future will hold true. In this analysis, such uncertainties concern future energy demand, 
learning rates as well as job creation potential.  
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4. Economic, environmental and social analysis of technologies 
4.1 Research Findings  
This chapter reviews relevant electricity generation technologies for South Africa 
according to the methods described in chapter 3. These will be individually evaluated and 
findings are presented from chapter 4.1.1 through chapter 4.1.7. In chapter 4.2, results will 
be synthesized and discussed with regard to sensitivities from parameter variations.  
4.1.1 Coal 
Coal is the predominant energy source for electricity generation in South Africa and is thus 
the technology that serves as a benchmark in an economic evaluation of other technologies. 
Unlike with other technologies, it is not very capital intensive during the commissioning of 
the plant, but it is very sensible to fuel costs and their future development. Even though 
Eskom has signed supply contracts with the mining industry which are well below 
international export prices for South African coal, McKay (2012) and Creamer (2013c) 
expect the future purchasing price for a metric ton (t) of coal to increase substantially for 
South Africa’s state utility. Thus, it is expected here that the coal price will converge with 
the international export price in the long-run. Projections for future prices are based on 
historical coal export prices and on extrapolations of their logarithmic, linear and 
exponential regressions, as depicted in figure 14.  
Figure 14: Price projections for South African sub-bituminous coal export prices 
 
Source: Own projection based on historical coal price (IndexMundi, 2013). 
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Taking these as a basis, Eskom’s coal purchase price is then expected to increase from 349 
ZAR/t in 2015 (McKay, 2012) to either 848, 1930 or 6080 ZAR/t in 2065, depending on 
the scenario. The corresponding price escalation rates from 2015 to 2065 are calculated 
based on the geometric growth formula
19
. All other relevant parameters underlying the 
LCOE calculation are presented in Appendix 3 and the Medupi power station, a new dry-
cooled super-critical power station with flue gas desulphurization (FGD) was chosen as 
reference case. When the formulas described in the previous chapter are applied, LCOE for 
this coal power plant range between 614.49 and 973.13 ZAR/MWh, with 712.97 
ZAR/MWh being the median scenario. This is partly in line with what Dames, Eskom’s 
CEO said in (2012, in Yelland, 2012) when he claimed that LCOE from the new Medupi 
and Kusile power stations would come significantly below 0.71 ZAR/KWh. However, 
Yelland (2012) reported that critics believed the LCOE to be significantly higher than 
indicated by Dames, given increasing costs.  
If externalities are added to an economic evaluation of coal power, the cost of electricity 
from that source is subject to an enormous increase. A study from Blignaut et al. (2011) 
reports external costs between 0.97 and 1.88 ZAR/KWh.
20
 Inflated to ZAR2012 values and 
converted to the unit of analysis (ZAR/MWh), costs translate to 1111.38, 1635.53 and 
2159.67 ZAR/MWh respectively. These indirect costs are higher than direct costs 
associated with this technology and include externalities from health impacts, GHG 
emissions, water use and coal mining. All numbers are based on conservative assumptions, 
taking for example a global carbon cost of 12.78 and 20.67 USD2010/tCO2-eq. as basis. The 
greatest portion comes from opportunity costs of water consumption which account for 
almost 70% of total external costs. All underlying parameters are presented in Appendix 3.  
In terms of job creation potential, a new super-critical coal power plant requires on average 
3.1 jobs per MW of installed capacity (Edkins et al., 2010b, Van Wyk et al., 2011). About 
80% of the jobs are involved in the construction and the manufacturing of the power plant, 
while only one fifth is attributed to O&M of a coal power plant.  
A super-critical coal power plant provides base load power, has a typical capacity factor of 
85% and a hot ramp-up time of about one hour. This means that this technology provides a 
relatively stable amount of electricity output which can be used to satisfy a constant level 
                                                 
19
 Xt = X0*(1+g)
t
, where g is the growth rate, Xt the end value, X0 the initial value and t is time in years.  
20
 The computed average value is 1.43 ZAR/KWh. The average value was not reported in the study, but is 
will be used here as a proxy for the median-case scenario. 
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of market demand. At the same time, coal power plants are impractical to cover demand 
peaks given their low degree of flexibility. An energy system that is based on a high share 
of coal, as it is the case in South Africa, must thus use an international market to balance 
system load in times of under- or oversupply. In the long-run, when more flexible or 
intermittent energy sources might be connected to South Africa’s grid, new measures to 
increase load flexibility and load change velocity of the existing power fleet will become 
necessary. Hesler (2011) argues that these will be challenging and that existing power 
plants are not really designed to meet these criteria.   
In terms of energy security, coal power plants perform as follows. In 2011, proven reserves 
amounted to 48 Gt, while production in that year was 250.317 Mt. Thus, the reserves-to-
production ratio is about 192 years. Social marginal costs range, according to this analysis, 
between 1726 and 3133 ZAR/MWh at a discount rate of 5%. The total efficiency of a coal 
power plant from coal input to electricity output is around 40% and the plant needs to 
produce energy for about 7 years to offset the energy used during its construction. The 
Medupi power station will likely need a construction lead time of 10 years, which is very 
long. The results are depicted in Table 6: 
Table 6: Overview energy security indicators for super-critical coal power plant   
Dimension Indicator Metric Values Source 
Availability Proven recoverable energy 
reserves 
Reserves-to-production ratio 192 (Maleka et al., 2010) 
Affordability Social marginal cost of 
electricity generation 
ZAR/MWh 1725.87  – 3132.80 calculated 
Efficiency Energy end-use efficiency η, ratio energy input to output 0.4 (EURELECTRIC, 2003) 
Technology 
Development 
Lead time for construction 
of power plant 
Number of years 10 (Eskom, 2013e) 
Sustainability Energy payback ratio Life-time energy output to input 7 (Gagnon, 2005) 
Sources:Various sources, see table. 
4.1.2 Nuclear 
The latest version of the IRP anticipates a nuclear new-build capacity of 9.6 GW, even 
though its necessity was challenged in a recent study from the ERC (2013). This upgrade 
would come in addition to one existing nuclear power station in Koeberg near Cape Town, 
which has a capacity of 1800 MW, and the Safari-1 research reactor in Pelindaba. A 
nuclear purchasing program is likely to be commenced in mid-2013, and Campbell (2013) 
reported that Eskom expects offers from Areva, Korea Electric Power Corporation, 
Rusatom and Westinghouse for Generation III or III+ reactors. Thus, LCOE are calculated 
for such a power plant design. Parameters are drawn from the IRP (DoE, 2010) and from 
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the ERC (2013) study which provides updated assumptions on capital costs. This data is 
complemented with estimates from Stott (2012, in Kotzé, 2012) about uranium fuel costs. 
Further assumptions had to be made with regard to the escalation rates for O&M costs and 
fuel costs. Bruynooghe et al. (2010) estimate that O&M costs will increase  and a value of 
0.5% above the inflation rate is assumed here.  
It is also estimated that fuel prices will be subject to increase in the future, given that the 
IAEA (2001) forecasted a long-term scarceness and increasing exploration costs for natural 
uranium. Eskom currently covers about 25% of its nuclear fuel needs from natural uranium 
purchases in South Africa, Namibia and other African countries, while 75% of the fuel is 
purchased as enriched uranium from suppliers in Europe and Russia (Kotzé, 2012). 
Consequently, it can be concluded that some level of dependency to international market 
prices exists and that prices will increase by 1% per year. Yet data on fuel cost calculations 
are nontransparent in the IRP, especially with regard to the enrichment process, and 
calculated fuel costs would result in unrealistically low values. That is why the number 
assumed for fuel cost will be drawn from Stott (2012 in Kotzé, 2012), who has estimated 
fuel cost for nuclear power plants at 40% of those from coal power plants. All data 
underlying the LCOE calculation are shown in Appendix 4. LCOE of 658.45 ZAR/MWh 
result from these calculations.   
Rabl and Rabl (2013) estimated the externalities of nuclear power in a post-Fukushima 
study. Taking into account both external costs from normal operation, which include 
current operation and waste management, and external costs from accidents, they obtain 
total external costs between 0.25 and 3.22 Eurocents/KWh, with a central estimate of 0.79 
Eurocents/KWh. Adjusted to the context in South Africa with the formula suggested by 
Nahman (2011), external costs translate to 8.02, 25.33 and 103.26 ZAR/MWh.  
In addition, external costs which include the risk of an accident have been assessed in a 
study by Meyer (2012). She reported a range of risk-adjusted external costs between 10.7 
and 34 Eurocents/KWh as realistic, averaging at 22.35 Eurocents/KWh. Adjusted to the 
South African context with Nahman’s formula, these numbers translate into 300.96, 628.65 
and 956.33 ZAR/MWh. It must be noted that Meyer’s estimates vary by an order of 
magnitude of 9-36 from Rabl and Rabl’s, but these two studies are the only recent studies 
identified that quantify risks and costs of nuclear accidents. When taking the precautionary 
principle as the underlying normative framework to evaluate a technology, it is compelling 
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to contemplate all possible events and to consequently use the entire bandwidth of 
estimates as scenarios. Although nuclear power is also a very water-intensive technology 
which requires high amounts of water for thermal cooling, no water use externalities are 
included in the South African context. This is because Eskom (2013d) uses once-through 
cooling systems which are based on sea-water cooling where the water is released back to 
the sea after usage without consuming any fresh-water. Thus, no opportunity costs of fresh 
water are included in the analysis for nuclear.  
In terms of job creation, a new nuclear program could be beneficial for the South African 
economy. If the 9.6 GW capacity extension program is rolled out as planned, Kirillov 
(2013, in Campbell, 2013) estimates the permanent employment potential at approximately 
4000 engineers and 27000 construction workers.
21
 This would translate into 3.2 jobs/MW. 
Edkins et al. (2010b) have come up with a similar value and project a job creation potential 
of 2.5 jobs/MW for the nuclear industry in South Africa. However, Sokolov (2013, in 
Campbell, 2013) alludes that the establishment of an effective nuclear industry sector 
depends on how well legal, regulatory, technical, human, industrial, safety and security 
aspects are developed.  
Similar to a coal power plant, nuclear power serves the base load fraction in an electricity 
system (Rabl and Rabl, 2013). In fact, nuclear power plants produce the most stable load 
output, but are also the most inflexible option of electricity generation. The main argument 
that is brought forward in favor of expanding the South African nuclear program is that 
nuclear is a cost-effective and CO2-neutral option of diversifying the country’s electricity 
supply, even more important in times when coal prices are subject to increase in a carbon-
constrained world (DME, 2008). It is thus seen by many as the preferable option to 
increase security of supply. The associated performance parameters are depicted in table 7: 
Table 7: Overview energy security indicators for nuclear power plants in South Africa   
Dimension Indicator Metric Values Source 
Availability Proven recoverable energy 
reserves 
Reserves-to-production ratio >100 (NEA/IAEA, 2012) 
Affordability Social marginal cost of 
electricity generation 
ZAR/MWh 666.47  – 1614.78 calculated 
Efficiency Energy end-use efficiency η, ratio energy input to output 37 % (WNA, 2013) 
Technology 
Development 
Lead time for construction 
of power plant 
Number of years 16 (DoE, 2010) 
Sustainability Energy payback ratio Life-time energy output to input 14 - 16 (Gagnon, 2005) 
Sources:Various sources, see table. 
                                                 
21
 Here, construction jobs are counted towards permanent jobs given a lead time of 16 years for this project.  
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4.1.3 Natural gas 
In 2013, natural gas is virtually non-present as a fuel in South Africa’s ESI, but may 
become an important option if unconventional gas will be recovered from the Karoo Basin 
(Botha and Yelland, 2011). Instead, diesel fuel sourced from the domestic CTL industry 
fires five Eskom power stations with open-cycle gas turbine technology (OCGT), which 
have a combined capacity of 2452 MW. These flexible power stations are built to supply 
electricity during peak demand hours and for system stabilization. Two new OCGT 
peaking stations are currently being constructed by IPPs, Avon and Dedisa, adding another 
1005 MW of capacity (International Power GDF SUEZ, 2011) to the grid. If new supplies 
of domestic natural gas were available on a larger scale, these seven OCGT power plants 
could easily be upgraded into more efficient combined-cycle gas turbine power plants 
(CCGT) running on natural gas. Moreover, it is also possible to retrofit aging coal-fired 
power stations into gas power stations at economic benefits, which has been disclosed by 
Silverstein (2013) who claimed that a switch to gas was beneficial for climate and job 
creation. This has been shown in the US and other countries, where shale gas supplies 
become increasingly important. Consequently, it is worthwhile to have a closer look at 
CCGT power plants as a flexible option to cover peak demand, intermediate demand as 
well as base load in South Africa. Subsequently, three alternative capacity factors of f = 
5%, 50% and 85% will be taken as basis for an analysis of the CCGT option.  
The outcome of LCOE analysis based on the parameters described in Appendix 5 adds up 
to lowest LCOE of 640.54 ZAR/MWh, for a gas power plant producing base load at f = 
85%, to 698.25 ZAR/MWh for a CCGT plant delivering intermediate load at f = 50% and 
finally to LCOE of 1959.61 ZAR/MWh for peak electricity output, when the plant is only 
used at a capacity factor of 5%. This considerable variance in LCOE shows that the cost 
for electricity from a gas power plant is pretty much fuel intensive and thus fluctuates with 
the plant utilization (f).   
External costs from CCGT power plants are estimated to range of 1326.75, 1589.42 and 
1840.43 ZAR/MWh. However, it must be admitted that the given external cost analysis for 
shale gas combustion is by no means complete, given the novelty of the technology and the 
resulting lack of empirical data and contributions to the scientific research body. This 
concerns, inter alia, estimations on external costs resulting from a diminishing value of 
land property close to gas wells, as Muehlenbachs et al. (2012) allude. In addition, it is a 
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difficult task to quantify the harm to society from large amounts of fresh water necessary 
and from groundwater contamination which occurs during fracturing processes. While 
statistics on life-cycle fresh water consumption for shale gas-powered CCGT power plants 
have been published by Laurenzi and Jersey (2013), these have to be read with caution as 
they are financed by ExxonMobil Research and might be biased in favor of gas businesses. 
A too optimistic description of the benefits from this unconventional resource may be a 
result. Barth (2013), as well as Kinnaman (2011), elaborate on this deficiency more in 
detail. It also appears that Eskom’s average water costs of 3.47 ZAR/m³, paid in 2012, do 
not appear to reflect the true value of water in a water scarce country. Consequently, 
opportunity costs of water consumption had to be estimated. To do so, the same 
methodology and alternative technologies as used by Blignaut et al. (2011) were applied 
and opportunity costs of 1.14 ZAR/KWh to solar, 1.31 ZAR/KWh to wind and 1.49 
ZAR/KWh to coal were detected.
22
 This seems more reasonable, given the fact that shale 
gas extraction is more water intense than coal mining. Resulting median full cost estimates 
from shale gas-powered CCGT are then 2229.96, 2278.67 and 3549.03 ZAR/MWh, 
depending on underlying capacity factors. 
According to The Economist (2012), businesses and proponents of the gas industry 
generally describe job creation potential from their activities as substantial. However, it is 
at least questionable by how much the local rural population of the Karoo could directly 
benefit from a developing gas industry. This is also dependent on policies to be developed. 
Should CCGT power stations be built, Edkins et al. (2010b) and Van Wyk et al. (2011) 
estimate an average of 2.39 jobs per MW of installed capacity.  
As described earlier, the advantage with a CCGT power plant is that it can dispatch its 
output of electricity in a flexible way, being the most flexible of all fossil generation 
options. As a result, it offers a maximum availability factor. Within 5-7 minutes, capacity 
can be ramped-up and the power output can be adjusted to demand (Eskom, 2009b). If gas 
supplies should once be secured from domestic extraction of unconventional shale gas and 
power stations be deployed on a larger scale, both availability and energy security will 
benefit from it, as shown in table 8: 
 
 
                                                 
22
 See appendix 5.  
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Table 8: Overview energy security indicators for gas power plants in South Africa   
Dimension Indicator Metric Values Source 
Availability Proven recoverable energy 
reserves 
Total resource endowment Explorations 
ongoing 
(DMR, 2012) 
Affordability Social marginal cost of 
electricity generation 
ZAR/MWh 1967.29  – 3800.04 calculated 
Efficiency Energy end-use efficiency η, ratio energy input to output 50%  (Godoy et al., 2010) 
Technology 
Development 
Lead time for construction 
of power plant 
Number of years 3 (Lazard, 2012) 
Sustainability Energy payback ratio Life-time energy output to input 2.5 – 5 (Gagnon, 2005) 
Sources: Various sources, see table. 
4.1.4 Concentrating Solar Power 
CSP is an important option to generate electricity and heat in countries with good solar 
irradiance. Thus, this form of electricity generation is very interesting for South Africa, and 
Fluri (2009) has estimated the technical resource potential at 548 GW, or based on current 
plant capacity factors, at 1919 TWh per year, which exceeds South Africa’s electricity 
demand  manifold. Different technologies have evolved to capture sun energy, but all have 
in common that the solar irradiation is concentrated on a central location to heat a medium. 
When the heat is extracted, a conventional steam turbine can be powered from this (Coley, 
2008). In the IRP, the DoE (2010) committed to install a total CSP capacity of 1.2 GW by 
2025 in South Africa. Ahearne (2012) reported that 150 MW of parabolic through 
technology and 50 MW of solar tower technology have been allocated to IPPs in the first 
two REIPP bidding rounds. He added that a further 800 MW will be allocated in upcoming 
bidding rounds and that the remaining 200 MW will be constructed by Eskom. A bidding 
cap has been installed at 2.85 ZAR/KWh. Many plant designs exist, which makes it 
difficult to compare them in terms of LCOE. In this study, a power plant using solar tower 
technology with 3 hour storage capacity has been selected as the reference technology. 
Ernst&Young and Enolcon (2013) estimate local employment potential to be the highest 
for this kind of technology. When considering input parameters as summarized in 
Appendix 6, CSP in South Africa induces LCOE of 1308.66 ZAR/MWh. Like other RES, 
it is a capital intensive technology, but has the advantage of zero fuel costs and moderate 
O&M costs. In the literature, some variation concerning capital costs has been identified, 
therefore a conservative value of 59860 ZAR/MW has been chosen.  
Externalities of the solar tower technology are very moderate and include health impacts 
and GHG emissions. For different scenarios of global damage costs from GHG emissions, 
total external costs amount to 11.26, 15.80 and 18.78 ZAR/MWh. So, full costs for CSP 
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come down to a range between 1319.92, 1324.46 and 1327.44 ZAR/MWh. The heat carrier 
medium of CSP power tower technology can be based on molten salt and consequently, 
such power plants are not dependent on fresh water consumption.     
CSP offers substantial potential for job creation in South Africa, as Ndebele (2012, in 
Ahearne, 2012) affirms. His assessment was confirmed in a survey conducted by Ernst & 
Young and Enolcon (2013), who revealed medium to high potential for several fragments 
in the value chain of a CSP project. In Spain, local value creation increased from an initial 
50% to 80% in the present, increasing the number of jobs in the country. Based on studies 
from Edkins et al. (2010b), Maia et al. (2011) and from the International Labour Office 
(Van Wyk et al., 2011), an average JCP of 17.6 jobs/MW is projected from construction 
and operation of a CSP plant in South Africa.  
With regards to availability of electricity, CSP offers a possibility to disassemble the 
collection of sun-energy (heat) and the production of electricity by means of thermal 
storage. Consequently, the degree of intermittency of that technology is reduced. Today, it 
is possible to build plants that are able to store heated liquids for up to 15 hours for 
electricity production. Therefore, the range of CSP plants can be extended from late 
morning hours through most of the night, which makes it suitable to serve intermediate and 
peak load during these hours. Through the means of storage, output becomes highly 
dispatchable. Nicholson et al. (2011) categorized CSP even as a base load technology. 
Improving the availability of an intermittent source is also a result of a stochastic analysis 
of the variability of weather patterns. Suri (2011) has reported a minimum of 2796 
KWh/m² of sun energy at the 90% confidence level near Upington, the location of the first 
plants to be constructed. Energy security patterns of CSP are illustrated in table 9: 
Table 9: Overview energy security indicators for CSP plants in South Africa   
Dimension Indicator Metric Values Source 
Availability Proven recoverable energy 
reserves 
Total renewable energy 
resource endowment 
548 GW, or          
1919 TWh 
(Fluri, 2009) 
Affordability Social marginal cost of 
electricity generation 
ZAR/MWh 1319.92  – 1327.44 calculated 
Efficiency Energy end-use efficiency η, ratio energy input to output 40 % (Lazard, 2012) 
Technology 
Development 
Lead time for construction 
of power plant 
Number of years 2 (Lazard, 2012) 
Sustainability Energy payback ratio Life-time energy output to input 80 (Jacobson, 2009) 
Sources: Various sources, see table. 
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4.1.5 Solar Photovoltaic 
Solar PV is the second technology option to harness sun energy in South Africa. Yet, an 
analysis of this technology can quickly become complex: various types of solar panels 
have evolved until today and there is still no “gold standard” for a dominant technology 
between silicon-based and thin-film applications. Another argument is that solar PV can be 
employed on different scales, ranging from residential to utility-scale applications which 
can either be grid connected or isolated. Moreover, the electricity output from solar panels 
depends on local solar irradiation levels as well as on tilt angles in which the panels are 
positioned. All in all, there are many different possible combinations of parameters and 
consequently, Darling et al. (2011) argue that parameter distributions must be used to 
estimate the LCOE of this technology in a realistic way. However, this is not feasible 
within the scope of this research, and thus one exemplary technology in combination with 
typical parameters must be chosen. As most interesting options to look at, a rural utility-
scale PV power plant (RUS) with 10 MW capacity and a residential roof-top application 
(RRT) with 1 KW capacity, both located near Upington and composed of polycrystalline 
silicon PV panels were selected as the reference projects for analysis. This makes sense as 
bulk energy generation options are compared throughout this analysis. Besides, both CSP 
and PV can be compared on a common basis if their output is measured under identical 
geographical conditions. Finally, it makes economically sense to install solar power plants 
in the most favorable places first.    
All other technical parameters related to the analysis have been taken from most recent 
literature available and are specified in Appendix 7. For such exemplary applications, 
LCOE range between 939.90 ZAR/MWh for RUS and 1456.28 ZAR/MWh for RRT.  
During the lifecycle of a PV power plant, quantifiable externalities stem from GHG 
emissions and health issues during the production process of plant components. Given low 
GHG emission factors which range between 23 – 44 kg CO2-eq./MWh (Peng et al., 2013) 
and moderate health effects of 2.32 ZAR/MWh (Edkins et al., 2010c) external costs remain 
low compared to other generation options. Consequently, external costs of a PV power 
plant in South Africa range between 2.47, 6.55 and 11.33 ZAR/MWh dependent on 
assumptions on GHG abatement costs.    
A development of the PV sector could become a job motor in South Africa, especially 
additional manufacturing facilities for solar panels will be opened up. All three studies on 
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job market potential in South Africa’s ESI attribute a high job creation potential to new PV 
power plants. On average, Edkins et al. (2010b), Van Wyk et al. (2011) and Maia et al. 
(2011) report a number of 30.1 jobs/MW of installed PV capacity. Maia et al. thus 
conclude that PV is among the top generators of new direct employment from RES.  
Contrarily to CSP there are not yet any reliable large-scale storage concepts for PV-
generated electricity and this energy source is thus still dependent on weather conditions. 
Although commercial advances in storage technology are likely to be introduced soon, it is 
more realistic to estimate that a utility-scale PV power plant will feed its production 
directly into the grid in South Africa. Still, this has advantages: daily output patterns of PV 
can be very favorable for the load management of an electricity system. As PV electricity 
is generated during day-time with output peaking around noon, PV power plants can 
reduce the burden on the electricity system, which has then a reduced residual peak 
demand. This functionality has proven successful in Brazil and was described by Rüther et 
al. (2008). It is outlined in figure 15.  
Figure 15: Effect of PV feed-in on peak electricity demand 
 
Source:(Rüther et al., 2008). 
Even though solar PV is an intermittent source of energy, its economic value might be 
significant as marginal costs during peak demand hours could be lower than that of other 
peak generation options. Furthermore, deployment of PV on a larger scale in South Africa 
might be a substitute to demand reduction programs which are generally more difficult to 
handle for utilities and customers. This way, PV is a source of energy that scores well in 
many dimensions of energy security, which are listed in Table 10: 
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Table 10: Overview energy security indicators for PV in South Africa   
Dimension Indicator Metric Values Source 
Availability Proven recoverable energy 
reserves 
Total renewable energy 
resource endowment 
1000 TWh (Edkins et al., 2010a) 
Affordability Social marginal cost of 
electricity generation 
ZAR/MWh 942.37  – 1467.61 calculated 
Efficiency Energy end-use efficiency η, ratio energy input to output 12% calculated 
Technology 
Development 
Lead time for construction 
of power plant 
Number of years 2 (Lazard, 2012) 
Sustainability Energy payback ratio Life-time energy output to input 5.7 – 26.7  (Peng et al., 2013) 
Sources: Various sources, see table. 
4.1.6 Wind Power 
Wind power is the third important option for renewable electricity generation in South 
Africa. In search of low-carbon electricity generation alternatives, the DoE (2010) has 
included new wind power capacity of 8400 MW in its policy-adjusted scenario in the IRP. 
Consequently, new wind farms will be developed throughout the next years, with about 
400 MW coming online each year during the next decade. Several wind farm projects are 
already under construction.  
The economic value of a wind power station depends on a multitude of factors. Most 
important for the performance of a wind turbine are location and the prevailing average 
wind speed patterns that determine how much energy the power plant can capture. Other 
important factors are the choice of optimal parameters of the power plant, which include 
rated turbine capacity, hub height, rotor diameter, cut-in and cut-out wind speeds
23
 and 
other factors that influence operation and maintenance requirements for the plant. 
According to Ayodele et al. (2012), who have recently modeled the technical potential of 
wind power plants at 10 different measurement sites in South Africa’s Western Cape 
region, the combination of all these factors sets the optimal choice of turbine specifications 
and the maximally achievable capacity factor at that site.  
Based on the results from Ayodele et al., a state of the art onshore turbine with 3 MW rated 
capacity, a hub height of 80m and a rotor diameter of 112m, was chosen as the relevant 
technology for LCOE analysis. The achievable capacity factor for the wind power plant 
was estimated at 35%, based on the range of capacity factors reported in the modeling 
results from Ayodele et al. (2012). With these parameters (listed in Appendix 8), LCOE for 
a wind power turbine amount to 529.73 ZAR/MWh. 
                                                 
23
 These are the wind speeds at which the turbine starts production (cut-in) and at which it is stopped if wind 
speeds are too strong (cut-out).  
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One main advantage of wind power is the low level of external effects associated with this 
technology. In recent total life-cycle assessments of wind turbines, emission intensity 
factors between 4.97 and 9.00gCO2-eq./KWh were reported by Wang and Sun (2012) and 
Guezuraga et al. (2012). Apart from minor health effects during the production of the 
power plant, no significant and measureable external effects have been identified in the 
literature body (Kaygusuz, 2010). Thus, external costs only add up to 1.13, 1.98 and 2.94 
ZAR/MWh for different scenarios.   
A growing number of wind power projects will have positive employment effects for the 
value chain of wind power in South Africa. Averaged over existing employment impact 
studies carried out by Edkins et al. (2010b), Maia et al. (2011) and Van Wyk et al. (2011), 
wind power projects generate as much as 9.1 jobs/MW of new installed capacity. Van Wyk 
et al. (2011) argue that this figure is conditional on a threshold level of 150-200 MW of 
new capacity per year that must be brought online over at least three years in a row in order 
to trigger the development of a  domestic wind power manufacturing industry in South 
Africa. 
Despite all advantages, wind energy has the draw-back of being an intermittent and non-
dispatchable source of energy. Consequently, an energy system cannot only rely on wind 
energy, as the wind might just not blow at a given point of time. However, measurements 
of historical wind patterns are currently collected and condensed in the Wind Atlas of 
South Africa (WASA). The WASA helps to predict the power outcome of certain sites 
with a degree of certainty. A thorough analysis by Ayodele et al. (2012) has shown that on 
average, wind blows regularly during evening peak demand hours in South Africa and at 
these times higher capacity factors can be reached with wind power plants. 
Complementary to higher solar outputs during the morning peak, wind power is therefore a 
near ideal fit to reduce the demand peak pressure in South Africa. Furthermore, 
intermittency and dispatchability factors can be improved much in favor of wind power 
through a combination with storage capacity, for instance with pumped-storage hydro 
technology (Avery, 2007).  
Hence, wind power contributes to South African energy security, scoring particularly well 
in the availability, affordability, technology and sustainability dimensions. All results are 
displayed in Table 11:  
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Table 11: Overview energy security indicators for wind power in South Africa   
Dimension Indicator Metric Values Source 
Availability Proven recoverable energy 
reserves 
Total renewable energy 
resource endowment 
80 TWh (Hagemann, 2009) 
Affordability Social marginal cost of 
electricity generation 
ZAR/MWh 530.86  – 531.97 calculated 
Efficiency Energy end-use efficiency η, ratio energy input to output 40-45% (Chen et al., 2009) 
Technology 
Development 
Lead time for construction 
of power plant 
Number of years 1 (Lazard, 2012) 
Sustainability Energy payback ratio Life-time energy output to input 34 (Gagnon, 2005) 
Sources: Various sources, see table. 
4.1.7 Other renewable energy sources 
In addition to the energy sources analyzed thoroughly in the previous chapters, there are 
other RES which have the potential to play a role in South Africa’s future ESI. However, 
their potential contribution seems to be limited either by physical or technological 
constraints. These energy sources include wave power, different forms of biomass and 
small-scale hydro power. For reasons of completeness, the main issues with these sources 
will be discussed briefly here.  
Among other renewable energy sources, wave power is the most promising option for 
future electricity generation, with a technical potential of about 18.7 TWh per annum. This 
substantial estimate led to more focused research on that technology, and measurements 
are currently carried out by research institutes, Eskom and other private companies. It is 
likely that this technology may contribute to the supply industry in a not so distant future. 
However, as of today it is very difficult to evaluate these options economically, given the 
immatureness of the technologies and the few real-world applications that exist. 
Biomass is already an important source of energy in South Africa and it could become 
more important for the electricity sector. Dasappa (2011) estimated the potential 
contribution of biomass to the supply mix at a further 643 MW which translate to about 4.8 
TWh. This estimate is based on a sustainable use of biomass from agricultural residues, 
and takes neither extra plantations of cereals nor wood cutting into account. He argues that 
unlike other RES, biomass power plants or co-firing in compatible coal-fired power plants 
would have the advantage of high load factors and lower carbon intensity. Biomass is thus 
one of the few RES suitable for base load generation. An additional benefit with biomass is 
that its collection is very employment intensive and thus beneficial for job creation.  
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Last but not least, hydro power is limited by low levels of precipitation in South Africa, 
which receives only half of the world average in rainfall. While large hydro power plants 
have mostly been developed where economically feasible, opportunities for small-scale 
hydro applications remain. Although not very effective for bulk-energy generation, Van 
Vuuren et al. (2011) estimated a technical potential of 0.9 TWh per year from small-scale 
hydro power plants in South Africa. This is mainly originating from a large number of 
existing dams which could be retrofitted with small-scale generation turbines at 
comparably low investment costs. In addition, supplementary artificially built pumped-
storage schemes could still play an important role as a means of storage for solar and wind 
energy, in case the share of such intermittent RES in the system is increased. 
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4.2 Discussion  
4.2.1 Summary statistics 
Throughout chapter 4.1, comprehensive impact analyses of all technologies have been 
carried out and were presented individually. The results obtained are now contrasted and 
discussed in this chapter.  
The first direct comparison of technologies is made at the LCOE level: while the LCOE for 
coal power are indicated as a range of possible costs with a lower and upper bound, median 
LCOE were reported for all other technologies. This was owed to the uncertainty with the 
future development of the coal price in South Africa. Other fuel intensive technologies 
compared are nuclear and natural gas. The mechanisms of fuel pricing in the nuclear 
industry were found to be very intransparent. The price of natural gas from domestic shale 
gas resources was estimated to remain constant over the 30-year life-time horizon of a 
CCGT plant. In contrast, costs are more firm to foresee for the capital cost-intensive 
technologies and so median LCOE are a reasonable estimate to make with CSP, PV and 
wind. This is why all LCOE figures other than coal are expressed as median cost estimates. 
Figure 16 contrasts the results from the analysis, grouped into base load, intermediate load 
and peak load generation options. Intermittent energy sources are separately displayed in 
the last column.  
Figure 16: Summary median LCOE all technology options 
 
Source: Author. 
From figure 16, it can be inferred that median LCOE for base load technologies are 
comparably low and almost balanced. Coal is an outlier in the sense that there is the 
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possibility of being slightly cheaper or considerably more expensive than nuclear and base 
load natural gas. Among intermediate load technologies, natural gas has LCOE which are 
about 48% lower than for CSP. For the peak load sector, natural gas is the only option 
examined and its LCOE more than double with respect to base and intermediate load. The 
highest LCOE of all technologies is caused by the low capacity factor of the option with a 
resulting high share of fix costs attributed to each unit of electricity generated. 
Unfortunately, this option is the only dispatchable back-up power at present, apart from 
diesel fired-OCGT and a pumped-storage scheme with limited capacity. When it comes to 
intermittent energy sources, substantial differences exist between wind and solar power. 
While wind power was found to have the lowest LCOE of all technologies, PV RUS is 
cost-competitive with intermediate load CSP. On the other hand, PV RRT is due to many 
small scale implementations the second most expensive option, but it is still considerably 
cheaper than peak load natural gas.  
In a second step, indirect costs of all technologies were evaluated. The results from lower, 
upper and median case scenarios are visualized in figure 17:   
Figure 17: Summary external costs all technology options 
 
Source: Author. 
The figure shows that burning coal causes the highest externalities if median externalities 
estimates are compared. Yet, coal could still be topped by natural gas in the lower bound 
scenario, when low GHG damage costs and opportunity costs for water a taking are 
assumed in the externalities evaluation. In either case, both technologies impose far higher 
levels of external costs to the society at large than all other technologies. While the 
possible variation of externalities is much higher for coal, external effects from shale gas 
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are not subject to this much deviation, given their comparatively relatively low emission 
intensity compared with coal.  
Next, nuclear power is a special case in terms of risk assessment and indirect costs. The 
large error bar in relation to other technologies is a clear sign for the difficulty to 
reasonably evaluate the risk of this technology. For example, Rabl and Rabl (2013) report 
probabilities of major accidents, which are only based on two past events in Chernobyl and 
Fukushima. Whether this approach allows for inferences about the frequency of future 
accidents can at least be doubted. In addition, their study fails to consider several other 
factors that might also influence the probability of accidents. These include increasing 
frequency of natural disasters from climate change, increasing average age of the power 
plant fleet and an increasing total number of plants. Also, it seems early to objectively 
evaluate health damages from the Fukushima accident, and Gluzman et al. (2012) point out 
that there even remains controversy about the number of thyroid cancers resulting from 
Chernobyl. All these factors bias the results and make an objective evaluation of nuclear 
power difficult. The last observation from figure 17 is that CSP, PV and wind power entail 
considerably lower external costs to society than all other technologies.  
The logical next step is now to consolidate direct and indirect costs of the technologies to 
have a say about their overall economic impact and competitiveness. The outcome of this 
process is expressed by figure 18:  
Figure 18: Summary full costs all technology options 
 
Source: Author. 
It can be noted quickly, that an accommodation of indirect costs has effects on the ranking 
order in the base load and intermediate load segments. In the new picture, NG BL becomes 
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the second most expensive technology option in terms of median full costs, only surpassed 
by coal. Due to its large error bar, coal can either be the most expensive base load option or 
be almost competitive with high-cost nuclear. Still, median full cost of nuclear are lower 
than that of coal and NG BL, if one accepts the risk-evaluation from the studies cited.  
In the intermediate load segment, CSP has now become substantially cheaper than natural 
gas. Both options are not very reactive to variations in indirect costs, a fact that improves 
the level of certainty of the outcome. In the peak load segment, short-time supply gaps 
have to be covered by CCGT at full costs ranging between 3286.36 and 3800.04 
ZAR/MWh. Last but not least, intermittent technologies have become competitive with 
most technologies in other load segments. From a full-cost perspective in the context of 
South Africa, these RES gain an economic advantage over fossil-based generation 
technologies.  
The next dimension of analysis is employment impacts for the economy from investments 
into new power plants. Figure 19 contrasts estimates for permanent job creation potential 
of different technology options in the value chain of the South African Energy industry.  
Figure 19: Summary job creation potential all technology options 
 
Source: Author. 
The graph highlights that fossil-based energy sources are more employment-efficient in 
terms of jobs/MW and contribute to fewer new jobs in the economy if chosen for energy 
investments. However, this does not express anything about the options to be preferred 
from a project developers’ or policy makers’ cost-benefit point of view, and employment 
creation itself is a political topic with the question of interchangeability of capital and labor 
at its heart. Assuming however, that employment creation for domestic jobs is a result from 
transfer of technology and from a localization of segments of the energy industry value 
chain, then new “green industries” are often praised as a preferable political goal for the 
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government of an emerging economy (Maia et al., 2011). In the case of South Africa, PV, 
CSP and wind are then technologies with higher value in terms of new job creation.  
The last assessment is made between energy security indicators. This is a challenging 
comparison because a “numerical ranking” between options with differing degrees of 
flexibility
24
 might not be compelling at a first glance. Nevertheless, technical options to 
overcome this issue
25
 exist and are being developed to improve the balance of an electricity 
system. Thus, it makes sense to compare the relative performance of technologies by 
grouping them into the categories “worst performance” (red), “average performance” 
(yellow) and “best performance” (green). Table 12 contrasts the resulting scorings of all 
technologies: 
Table 12: Summary energy security indicators all technologies   
Indicator Coal Nuclear NG CSP PV Wind 
(Potential) yearly production / 
Reserves-to-production ratio 
218.2 TWh, 
192 years 
13.5 TWh, 
>100 years 
Explorations 
ongoing 
1919 TWh, 
renewable 
1000 TWh, 
renewable 
80 TWh, 
renewable 
SMC in ZAR/MWh 1726  – 3133 666 - 1615 1967 – 3800 1320 - 1327  942 - 1468 531 - 532 
Energy end-use efficiency 40% 37% 50% 40% 12% 40-45% 
Plant lead time in years 10 16 3 2 2 1 
Energy payback ratio 7 14 - 16 2.5 – 5 80 5.7 – 26.7 34 
Sources: Author.  
From this table, a general trend can be identified which seems contradictory to what many 
stakeholders involved in South African energy planning claimed: that coal and nuclear are 
the only technologies that bring energy security to South Africa. Contrarily, it can rather be 
detected that these two technologies score particularly poor compared to the other 
technologies. It can also be noticed that Wind and CSP score particularly well in the 
categories reported and thus contribute to enhanced energy security. It must be added that 
the selection of indicators is a selection carried out by the author of this research and might 
thus not be completely representative, but the results are nevertheless remarkable.    
4.2.2 Sensitivities of results 
As mentioned previously, results of cost analyses are always sensitive to the various input 
parameters chosen. More specifically, full costs depend on assumptions made for LCOE 
and for externalities valuation. LCOE can be sensitive to variations in capital costs, O&M 
                                                 
24
 Flexibility in this sense was characterized by base load, intermediate load, peak load and intermittency of 
energy sources.  
25
 For example, smart-grids, improvement in storage technologies or geographical dispersion of intermittent 
energy sources can improve overall flexibility of a system.  
75 
 
costs or fuel prices. When all these parameters are kept constant, results can still be 
sensitive to the discount rate chosen for analysis. At the other hand, external cost estimates 
are mainly sensitive to assumptions on a global carbon price and to opportunity costs for 
water consumption. While a price on carbon emissions was mentioned by Nicholson et al. 
(2011) as the main factor influencing externalities and consequently has been included into 
the analysis ex-ante with CO2 damage costs varying between 6.71 and 204.76 ZAR/tCO2-
eq., one important finding of this thesis was that opportunity costs for fresh water also 
considerably influence the competitiveness of coal and natural gas in South Africa. A 
variation in the value of opportunity costs of fresh water consumption might thus be of 
interest, especially given differences in water scarcity levels between many regions. Hence, 
two sensitivity analyses will be carried out and their impact on median full costs will be 
evaluated: first, alternating discount rates between 1-15% will be incorporated into 
analysis, and second, opportunity costs of water will be adjusted between decreased and 
increased by 50% each.  
Resulting shifts of median full costs of different technologies as a result of differing 
discount rates are illustrated in figure 20: 
Figure 20: Sensitivity of median full costs to discount rate 
 
Source: Author. 
From this illustration can be concluded that the choice of a higher discount rate benefits 
fuel-cost intensive technologies, whereas technologies requiring high initial investments 
become relatively more expensive. Consequently, the ranking order changes for CSP with 
regard to PV RRT at discount rates above 8.5% and both technologies become more 
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expensive than NG BL, NG IM and coal discount rates above 11%. Also, it can be 
observed that wind remains the lowest-cost alternative independent of the discount rate 
chosen, while peak load gas remains always most expensive. Interestingly, nuclear and PV 
RUS seem to remain at around the same price level over the full range of discount rates.  
The second sensitivity analysis was conducted with regard to opportunity costs of water 
consumption for coal and natural gas. The results are presented in figure 21: 
Figure 21: Sensitivity of median full costs to opportunity costs of water consumption 
 
Source: Author. 
This graph shows that natural gas is the most sensible technology with regard to assumed 
water costs. This fact can be derived from the steepness of the functions’ slopes from 
different NG technologies. Moreover, it can also be concluded that NG BL and NG IM 
become more expensive than coal at an opportunity cost of water of around 1.80 
ZAR/KWh. Thus, dry-cooled coal power stations become competitive with natural gas 
power plants, if opportunity costs for water are valued above the mentioned threshold. 
Overall, full economic costs of water-intensive technologies remain above those of non-
water intensive technologies, and come only close to the most expensive non-water 
intensive technology (PV RRT) in case of a 50% over-estimation of water costs (reduction 
of water price by -50%). Yet if water costs were under-estimated, the costs of fossil base- 
and intermediate load would indeed double with respect to alternative energy sources. 
77 
 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This research was guided by the main research aim of facilitating informed decision 
making with regard to new investments options for the electricity sector in South Africa. 
To ensure the best possible improvement for the country from the status-quo, such choices 
are to comply with the goals of a smart energy policy as defined by Griffin (2009), 
implying cost effectiveness (cheap) and long-term societal benefits (clean & secure). Based 
on that, three sub-objectives were derived and conceptualized, and corresponding data and 
information were analyzed, interpreted and synthesized throughout this work. In this 
chapter, the most important results from the research sub-objectives are summarized and 
relevant conclusions are drawn. From this process, recommendations for South African 
stakeholders will be derived and advises on their implementation will be given. Finally, the 
work will be rounded off with a critical reflection on its limitations and with suggestions 
for further research that turned up during the research process.  
5.2 Conclusion on Research Objectives 
The first sub-objective of this work was share background knowledge on South Africa’s 
electricity market.  
Revealed through an in-depth literature review, South Africa’s electricity market presented 
itself as a rather static market, transforming at a slow pace to a more competitive, 
diversified, and open market setting. This nexus is mainly owed to its history, to the 
structures created and to locked-in investments into the coal-minerals complex that 
occurred over the past decades. Nevertheless, if put into the regional context of Sub-
Saharan Africa or of other emerging economies, history has shown that South Africa 
performed well with regard to two important goals of a functioning electricity market: it 
guaranteed cheap prices and accessibility to electricity.  
However, it can be concluded that this comparably good performance has not resulted from 
deliberate energy planning, but from massive and phase-wise investments into capacity 
enlargements based on the domestic resource of coal. The advantages of these over-
investments and resulting under-valuation of the good “electricity” are now reversed into 
obstacles for further development of South Africa. By the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 
century, things seemed to have turned upside down in many international supply markets 
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and rising electricity prices can be observed in many markets. In the meanwhile, growing 
demand in electricity has resulted in new supply/demand gaps in South Africa and decision 
makers consequently scheduled the new builds of Medupi and Kusile coal power plants.  
At the same time, worldwide tendencies for more sustainable energy pathways given 
scientific consensus about climate change gained foothold in the developed world and 
many governments started to focus on alternative energy systems instead. Given 
unprecedented worldwide transparency resulting from international trade, emerging 
economies and developing countries become more and more urged to join industrialized 
countries on a more sustainable path with their energy systems and are forced to include 
carbon costs into their export products and services. As a result, countries such as South 
Africa find themselves in a situation where they must face seemingly conflicting goals 
with regard to a smart energy policy. Often renewable energy sources seem expensive at a 
first glance and are thus perceived as “luxury” options if measured with established metrics 
such as the LCOE. Niez (2010) argued that this has been the case in South Africa. From 
this perspective, it can be understood that only marginal amounts of renewable energy 
capacity entered policy plans such as the IRP, still prioritizing other options such as coal, 
nuclear, and gas. Supporting mechanisms and structures for RES were developed, but often 
not successfully implemented, something which has led to great market uncertainties for 
investors. Examples for such initiatives are the REFIT program, which failed or the still-
not-implemented unbundling of services through an ISMO. This would level the market 
playing field for new IPPs. However, Pegels (2012) pointed out that such problems were 
not uncommon, and that many countries, including developed countries, seemed to 
undergo phases of experimentation and market adaption with renewable energy policies.  
All in all, it can be adhered that the South African market structure is in a process of slow 
transformation and that stakeholders have learned from mistakes done in the past. 
However, if South Africa wants to reach its policy goals of market opening, electrification, 
diversification of supply sources, lowering of emission trajectories and increasing security 
of energy supply in due time, then the transformation would have to be considerably 
accelerated.  
The second research-objective was to develop a comprehensive framework which allows 
for a full-cost analysis of energy technologies, including economic, environmental and 
social aspects of energy planning.  
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The LCOE approach was introduced as the standard tool in the literature to compare costs 
of electricity produced from different technologies. It was argued that relying on this 
approach alone would lead to an over-allocation of investments into technologies that 
might not be favorable given environmental and social outcomes. Thus, indirect costs of 
electricity generation and risk in the case of nuclear have been inserted to the LCOE 
approach. Furthermore, non-monetary aspects where formalized to account for other 
important dimensions in energy planning. These included the potential for job creation, 
availability of electricity and energy security.  
Consequently, the framework covers far more aspects than merely the direct costs of a 
technology (LCOE), which are too often used as the sole proxy in simplified 
argumentations in favor or against one specific technology. While external costs were 
found easier to be included from a methodological point of view, other dimensions such as, 
job creation potential, energy security or nuclear risk were challenging to be captured in a 
sound approach. Thus, job creation potential was chosen to be measured in permanent jobs 
created over the entire value chain of a project, while some of Sovacool and Mukherjee’s 
(2011) energy security indicators were selected by the author based on dimensions and 
metrics that were “measureable by numbers”. Nuclear risk was incorporated through 
results taken out of two studies, but these were found to be incomplete in their 
measurements and full-cost results for nuclear are thus flawed. By grouping technologies 
into different load segments, the notion of “availability of energy sources” was also 
included also into the analysis. It can thus be concluded that framework developed in this 
study is more comprehensive and includes parts that allow for quantitative evaluation and 
parts that must be evaluated with a mixture of quantitative and qualitative aspects.  
The third sub-objective of this research was to apply the framework to relevant technology 
options given South Africa’s resource potential. In this sense, coal, nuclear, natural gas, 
CSP, PV and wind were identified as most important options and these technologies were 
assessed one by one. Comparing the full cost of these technologies revealed that an 
inclusion of external costs and risk altered the ranking between some of the technologies. 
The analysis confirmed what Roth and Ambs (2004) already predicted earlier: “In the no-
externality case, fossil fuel technologies are highly attractive but as XCs [externalities] 
increase, their fuel intensity and emissions raise their LCOEs well above those of wind….” 
While these authors also saw CCGT plants very competitive due to their “clean” emissions 
and high efficiencies, this research found out that South Africa would face high 
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opportunity costs of fresh water consumption which considerably increase the price of coal 
and natural gas from shale resources. A sensitivity analysis with regard to this factor 
revealed that water costs remain a prohibitive factor in economic terms, even if over-
evaluated by up to 50%. A second sensitivity analysis was conducted with regard to the 
discount rates chosen in the evaluation of the LCOE of technologies. It showed that fuel-
intensive technologies benefited from higher discount rates, because the present value of 
fuel costs occurring in the future is lower at high discount rates. Consequently, the ranking 
of technologies changed in the intermediate load segment for r > 11%, with natural gas 
being cheaper than CSP in that case, while the rankings in other segments were not 
affected by a variation of the discount rates between 1-15%. Hence, the results from the 
full-cost analysis are rather solid with regard to this parameter.   
From the examination of job creation potential and energy security indicators, it can be 
concluded that wind, CSP and PV are attractive options for South Africa. As a result, a 
smart energy policy for South Africa should consider CSP for intermediate load and 
natural gas for peak load new-builds, but include as much wind and rural utility-scale PV 
as possible to support peak generation. An objective conclusion for the base-load sector 
cannot be derived based on this analysis, due to the controversial risk evaluation with 
nuclear and the overlaps between the lower and upper scenarios with coal and natural gas.   
This result is valid if policy makers want to realize long-term benefits for South Africa. 
However, a diversification of the industry might prove difficult to be realized, as long as 
externalities are not yet included in today’s market prices. While an inclusion of carbon 
costs will likely be realized in most developed and emerging economies and thus has only 
limited effects on international competitiveness, high opportunity costs of fresh water use 
are predominantly a local problem for South Africa. They present a serious impediment for 
the competitiveness of the electricity sector. Logically, there are only two solutions to deal 
with the problem of high water costs: either society at large continues to pay for this factor 
through foregone opportunities, or the South African economy loses in international 
competitiveness, if true costs are included into domestic electricity prices, but this is 
something that Griffin (2009) sees as unrealistic to expect from an emerging economy.  
Based on these findings, recommendations for South African policy makers can be 
derived. These will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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5.3 Recommendations 
As revealed in the conclusion, wind, solar PV and CSP are the technologies that perform 
best in their respective load segments with regard to the three goals of a smart energy 
policy. They are the options to be preferred for a diversification of South Africa’s 
electricity sector. Consequently, it is recommended that these options should gain more 
weight in future energy planning. Especially CSP is currently undervalued with only 1.2 
GW of planned and committed capacity in the IRP (c.f. figures 2 and 7), which is by no 
means the capacity it economically deserves. To deal with their intermittent character, the 
relative full-cost advantage of these technologies could be used for investments into a 
reduction of their degree of intermittency. Improved storage technologies such as thermal, 
chemical or pumped-storage could help to do so.   
If higher shares of the aforementioned technologies are incorporated into the next IRP, the 
logical challenge concerns the choice of policy measures that guarantee actual deployment 
of preferable technologies. This is especially problematic as (some) preferences regarding 
technologies change when indirect costs and non-monetary aspects of energy planning are 
included in the evaluation. Hence, sensitive policies that balance the interests of all local 
stakeholders must be developed to ensure a successful deployment of preferred 
technologies, which still seem expensive from a purely market-based point of view.  
Therefore, frameworks should be shaped and regulations should be enacted that entail 
market mechanisms to optimally allocate investment decisions with a focus on long-term 
benefits. To diversify the electricity supply, it is recommendable to open the supply market 
towards IPP investments. Whether an optimal share of IPPs should be limited at 30% is 
another question and will not be discussed here. However, the large interest observed in 
South African solar, wind and gas markets is an indication that independent market 
participants will certainly bring the technological knowledge, innovativeness, required 
capital and competitive spirit to build out renewable energy projects and to stimulate the 
creation of new industries and employment opportunities. Thus, it is not only 
recommended that the South African government should regulate the market frameworks 
and trigger an unbundling of services through adoption of the ISMO, but also that 
investment certainty is increased for all stakeholders. Current discussions on new policies 
send out positive signals, but still fail to create momentum for a kick-start of sizeable 
renewable energy projects and the creation of domestic solar and wind clusters.  
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Realistically, it is clear that the market alone cannot be the sole vehicle to achieve the 
desired balance between cheap, clean and secure energy. Externalities are not market-
priced goods and aspects such as nuclear risk or opportunity costs of fresh water 
consumption are difficult to quantify. Thus, the government is advised to interfere and 
guide investments into the desired direction. This becomes especially evident in a decision 
on a new nuclear program, where this work cannot recommend a build-out based on Gen. 
III-III+ technology, given the uncertainty and irreversibility of such an investment. 
Contrarily, the REBID bidding process and the adoption of a carbon tax that will 
eventually reflect marginal damage costs of GHG emissions seem promising tools to 
ensure cost-reflective pricing. Another tool to internalize externalities would be the 
adoption of increased levies on non-preferred technologies that compensate for the 
damages caused. However, this is only effective if the government invests the money 
obtained at the benefit of the stakeholders concerned.  
Furthermore, a successful transition of the electricity supply industry also depends on the 
people engaged in that transition. Thus, it is recommended that South Africa focuses on 
domestic capacity and skills development and fosters on transfer of technology to ensure 
sustainable management of its energy resources (Winkler et al., 2009). This is, for 
example, not only essential in managing the challenges with regard to domestic shale gas 
resources and the representation of local and domestic long-term interests against 
international petroleum companies. It is also a necessary condition for the development of 
a green industry and the attraction of parts of solar and wind value chains in the country.  
In addition, electricity consumers must be actively engaged, informed and convinced about 
energy planning and transformation processes in the supply industry. Generally, this works 
well if the government can demonstrate that consumers can save money with a new 
measure. Here, starting points would be the residential sector with PV RTT priced at 14.63 
c/KWh which is below many of Eskom’s rates charged during peak hours (Eskom, 2013i). 
Another sign for the increasing competitiveness of alternative energy sources with rising 
electricity prices was put forward by Nel (2012), who observed that large electricity users 
began to develop their own generation options as they start to be competitive with Eskom’s 
marginal costs of new generation.  
Last but not least, it can be recommended that South Africa should engage in intensified 
international cooperation for a diversification of its electricity sector. The existing SAPP 
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market structure is a decent starting point, but to realize substantial positive effects in the 
region, physical exchange of electricity must increase. Then, in the medium run, South 
Africa could also supply other markets with wind and solar energy and benefit from better 
opportunities to balance domestic supply and demand. All in all, the derived 
recommendations can be summarized as in figure 21: 
Figure 22: Summary of recommendations 
 
Source: Author. 
It is hence a combination of different market-based and non-market-based measures that 
are recommended for South Africa to achieve a good balance between cheap, clean and 
secure supply of electricity. If, however, the implementation of these recommendations 
fails and South Africa continues to invest in seemingly cheaper coal-based or nuclear 
generation options, the following quote of Nicolas Sarkozy (2010, in Stiglitz et al., 2010), 
former French president, might highlight the consequences of such behavior:  
“It is possible to go for a long time without paying the true price of scarcity and risk, while 
being convinced of the contrary, but sooner or later the true price has to be paid. The bill 
is then much heavier, as behaviors based on these erroneous economic calculations have 
heightened the scarcity and the risk.” 
As explained earlier, a research process is a dynamic process during which new challenges 
and questions may occur. Given the limited scope of this research, not every issue that 
popped up could be considered. Thus, some of the major limitations in the scope of this 
work are described in the last chapter and suggestions for further research are made based 
on them.  
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5.4 Limitations of the work and suggestions for further research 
Apart from the conceptual limitations in the methodology underlying the analysis 
conducted, which were discussed in chapter 3.5, the following scope-related limitations 
might also bias the results and recommendations of this work.   
The scope of this research was limited to technologies which were considered as most 
important in the IRP2010. However, this pre-selection could have been incomplete and 
other technologies such as biomass, wave and tidal power, geo-thermal power or other yet 
unknown sources might turn out as favorable technologies for the context of South Africa. 
Thus, it might be fruitful analyze the potential of these technologies in more depth.  
This work suggests that higher shares of intermittent energy sources should be deployed in 
South Africa. With pointing to the example of Germany, Hirth (2013) argued that countries 
can often be include smaller shares of RES without major problems, while larger fractions 
will lead to impacts on the entire system. Then, questions such as load-management, 
necessary capacities for back-up power generation and transmission network must be 
addressed in further research.  
Other limitations appeared at the technological side and include the case of shale gas and 
water costs. As the IPCC (2011) pointed out, hydraulic fracturing of shale gas reserves 
may pose risks from spills of chemicals that have not yet been quantified in scientific 
research. Thus, quantification of such risks would be highly appreciated and these should 
then be included in economic analysis of South African natural gas. 
The literature review showed that a sound evaluation of nuclear power is difficult because 
the validity of results from existing externality studies seems limited. Given the long-term 
and large-scale impacts from this technology, new ethical standards based on international 
consensus must be developed to evaluate its risks and indirect costs.  
Last but not least, the issue of water requirements can be discussed controversially, as the 
water scarcity in South Africa implies conflicting use of fresh water. Consequently, water 
resources in South Africa must be allocated carefully and the needs of the energy sector 
must be evaluated against the needs of rivaling sectors such as the agriculture sector or the 
residential sector. As fresh water is a prerequisite for any on human life on earth, 
additional research on the true opportunity costs of fresh water consumption is suggested 
here.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Overview of associations with an interest in South Africa’s electricity market 
Field Name of organization Acronym Core interests 
All fields South African National Energy Association SANEA 
Provide platform for all 
stakeholders to mingle 
All fields South African Independent Power Producers Association SAIPPA 
Competitive electricity supply 
market 
Coal South African Coal Ash Association SACAA 
Promote coal combustion 
products 
Coal Coaltech Research Association  
Competitiveness of South 
African Coal industry 
Coal South African Colliery Managers’ Association SACMA 
Promote and bundle coal mining 
activities 
Coal Southern African Coal Processing Society SACPS Promote coal processing 
Coal, Nuclear Energy Intensive User Group EIUG 
Promote affordable energy and 
security of supply 
Energy 
efficiency 
Southern African Association for Energy Efficiency SAEE 
Increase awareness for energy 
efficiency 
Energy 
services 
South African Association of Energy Services Companies SAAEs 
Industry voice for energy 
services companies 
Nuclear Coalition Against Nuclear Energy CANE 
Oppose expansion of nuclear 
program 
Nuclear Koeberg Alert Alliance KAA 
Oppose expansion of nuclear 
program, promote RES 
Nuclear South African Nuclear Energy Corporation Ltd.  NECSA Promotion of nuclear energy 
RES Southern African Alternative Energy Association SAAEA 
Promote RES deployment, 
promote sustainable products 
RES Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa WESSA 
Promote RES and lower energy 
demand 
RES GreenCape Initiative  
Promote a green economy in the 
Western Cape 
Solar Sustainable Energy Society of Southern Africa SESSA 
Promote use of solar-based 
energy 
Solar Southern Africa Solar Thermal and Electricity Association SASTELA Promote CSP projects 
Solar South African Photovoltaic Industry Association SAPVIA 
Promote PV market in South 
Africa 
Solar cooking Association for Renewable Energy Cooking Appliances AFRECA Promote product development 
Wind African Wind Energy Association AfriWEA 
Promote wind energy 
development 
Wind South African Wind Energy Association SAWEA 
Promote wind energy 
development 
Source: Own illustration.   
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Appendix 2: Overview of Eskom power stations in South Africa 
 
Source: (Eskom, 2013g). 
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Appendix 3: Input parameters for dry-cooled coal power plant, super-critical technology with FGD 
Capital costs Value(s) 
Conversion to 
ZAR2012 
Source 
cp 2300 USD2012/kW 18860 (Eskom, 2012b) 
H 8760  given 
f 85%  (EPRI, 2010) 
CRF 5.47%  calculated 
r 5%  given 
T 50  (Eskom, 2013e) 
O&M costs Value(s)  Source 
Fixed O&M 455 ZAR2010/kW-yr 523.80 (EPRI, 2010) 
Variable O&M 44.4 ZAR2010/MWh 51.11 (EPRI, 2010) 
e 3.5%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
Fuel costs Value(s)  Source 
LHV 17.9 GJ/t  (IEA/NEA/OECD, 2010) 
Thermal efficiency 40%  (AfDB, 2009) 
Coal price in 2015 349 ZAR2012/t  (McKay, 2012) 
Coal prices in 2065 
848.06 ZAR2012/t (low)  
1930.48 ZAR2012/t (medium) 
6080.26 ZAR2012/t (high) 
 Projections from author 
e (low increase) 1.79%  Calculation from author 
e (moderate increase) 3.48%  Calculation from author 
e (high increase) 5.88%  Calculation from author 
Economic parameters    
2008 exchange rate ZAR/USD 8.30  (World Bank, 2013) 
2012 exchange rate ZAR/USD 8.20  (World Bank, 2013) 
2008 PPI 14.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2009 PPI -0.1%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2010 PPI 6.0%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2011 PPI 8.4%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2012 PPI 6.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
Externalities Scenarios low median  high   
Health externalities in ZAR2010/KWh 0.006 - 0.007  (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 6.91  8.06  calculated 
Climate change externalities in ZAR2010/KWh 0.097 - 0.165  (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 111.67  189.95  calculated 
Opportunity cost of water use in ZAR2010/KWh 0.66 - 1.311  (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 759.80  1509.23  calculated 
Coal mining externalities in ZAR2010/MWh 202,40 - 393,00  
(Nkambule and 
Blignaut, 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012 233,00  452,43  calculated 
Total externalities ZAR2012/MWh  1111.38 1635.53* 2159.67  calculated 
 *) Computed average value, given lack of median values.  
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Appendix 4: Input parameters for nuclear power plant, generation III type 
Capital costs Value(s) 
Conversion to 
ZAR2012 
Source 
cp 7000 USD2012/kW 57400  (ERC, 2013) 
H 8760  given 
f 90%  (Lazard, 2012) 
CRF 5.28%  calculated 
r 5%  given 
T 60  (Tidball et al., 2010) 
Plant capacity 1600 MW  Assumption 
O&M costs Value(s)  Source 
Fixed O&M 0 ZAR2010/kW-y 0 (DoE, 2010) 
Variable O&M 95.2 ZAR2010/MWh 110.67 (DoE, 2010) 
e 0.5%  Assumption 
Fuel costs Value(s)  Source 
Energy content uranium 3900 GJ/kg  (Lazard, 2012) 
Thermal efficiency 37%  (WNA, 2013) 
Price natural uranium 81.00 USD2012/kg 664.20 (TradeTech, 2013) 
Calculated variable fuel cost 1.66 ZAR2012/MWh  Calculation from author 
Total fuel cost  135.50 ZAR2012/MWh  (Kotzé, 2012) 
e  1 %  Assumption 
Economic parameters    
2007 exchange rate ZAR/USD 7.10  (World Bank, 2013) 
2012 exchange rate ZAR/USD 8.20  (World Bank, 2013) 
2008 PPI 14.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2009 PPI -0.1%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2010 PPI 6.0%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2011 PPI 8.4%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2012 PPI 6.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
Externalities    
ISA (GNI South Africa (2011) PPP in intl. $) 10710  (World Bank, 2012) 
IBC (GNI Euro area (2011) PPP in intl. $) 35250  (World Bank, 2012) 
IBC (GNI Germany (2011) PPP in intl. $) 40190  (World Bank, 2012) 
2012 exchange rate ZAR/EUR 10.55  (ECB, 2013) 
Externalities Scenarios low median  high   
External cost of accident, in Eurocent2012/KWh  0.08 0.38 2.29  (Rabl and Rabl, 2013) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 8.44 40.09 241.60  calculated 
External cost of current operation, in 
Eurocent2012/KWh 
0.07 0.21 0.63  (Rabl and Rabl, 2013) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 7.39 22.16 66.47  calculated 
External cost of waste management, in 
Eurocent2012/KWh 
0.10 0.20 0.30  (Rabl and Rabl, 2013) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 10.55 21.10 31.65  calculated 
Total external cost, in Eurocent2012/KWh 10.70 22.35* 34.00  (Meyer, 2012) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 1128.85 2357.93 3587.00  calculated 
Total externalities ZAR2012/MWh (Rabl & Rabl) 26.38 83.35 339.72  calculated 
Adjusted to South African PPP 8.02 25.33 103.26  (Nahman, 2011) 
Total externalities ZAR2012/MWh (Meyer) 1128.85 2357.93 3587.00  calculated 
Adjusted to South African PPP 300.96 628.65 956.33  (Nahman, 2011) 
 *) Computed average value, given lack of median values. 
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Appendix 5: Input parameters for CCGT gas power plant 
Capital costs Value(s) 
Conversion 
to ZAR2012 
Source 
cp 5780 USD2010/kW 6653.98 (EPRI, 2010) 
H 8760  given 
f 5%, 50%, 88%  (Lazard, 2012) 
CRF 6.51%  calculated 
r 5%  given 
T 30  (EPRI, 2010) 
Plant capacity 800 MW  Assumption 
O&M costs Value(s)  Source 
Fixed O&M 148 ZAR2010/kW-y 170.38 (EPRI, 2010) 
Variable O&M 0 ZAR2010/MWh  (EPRI, 2010) 
e 0.5%  (Roques et al., 2006) 
Fuel costs Value(s)  Source 
Price natural gas 73.56 ZAR2012/GJ  (NERSA, 2013a) 
Thermal efficiency CCGT plant 50%  (Godoy et al., 2010) 
Conversion factor GJ/MWh 3.6  given 
Total fuel cost  481.48 ZAR2012/MWh  calculated 
e  1 %  (Roques et al., 2006, ERC, 2013) 
Economic parameters    
2010 PPI 6.0%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2011 PPI 8.4%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2012 PPI 6.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
Externalities    
Average emission intensity CCGT power plant 470 gCO2-eq./KWh  (Nicholson et al., 2011) 
Upstream emission intensity shale gas 103 gCO2-eq./KWh  (Laurenzi and Jersey, 2013) 
Health impacts from power generation 0.34 ZAR2009 cents /KWh 0.42 (Edkins et al., 2010c) 
Health impacts from fuel production 0.14 ZAR2009 cents /KWh 0.17 (Edkins et al., 2010c) 
Biodiversity loss 0.39 ZAR2009 cents /KWh 0.48 (Edkins et al., 2010c) 
Loss in property values 
not quantifiable, lack in 
research 
 (Muehlenbachs et al., 2012) 
CCGT life cycle fresh water consumption 224 gallon/MWh  (Laurenzi and Jersey, 2013) 
Externalities Scenarios low median  high   
Global damage cost in ZAR2010/t CO2-eq.  5.83 109.80 177.79  (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 6.71 126.40 204.67  calculated 
External cost from GHG emissions, in 
ZAR2012/MWh 
3.75 70.72 114.51  calculated 
Opportunity cost of water use in ZAR2010/KWh 1.14 1.31 1.49  
calculated, based on        
(Blignaut et al., 2011)* 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 1312.38 1508.08 1715.30  calculated 
Total externalities ZAR2012/MWh 1326.75 1589.42 1840.43  calculated 
  
 
*) Calculation opportunity cost of water use based on (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
 Technology 
NMR of 
water 
Difference 
Water 
volume 
Net generation 
output 
Society-wide 
loss 
Opportunity 
cost 
 ZAR/m³ ZAR/m³ ZAR/m³ m³ MWh mZAR ZAR/KWh 
Baseline Gas CCGT  7872  27455636 32300748   
Alternative 1 Solar 14667 -6795 5405495 18237164 -36730 -1.14 
Alternative 2 Wind 930736 -922864 45989 12102466 42442 -1.31 
Alternative 3 Coal 9717 -1845 26166365 32300748 -48276 -1.49 
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Appendix 6: Input parameters for CSP power plant, solar tower technology with 3 hour storage 
Capital costs Value(s) 
Conversion to 
ZAR2012 
Source 
cp 7300 USD2012/kW 59860 (Lazard, 2012) 
H 8760  given 
f 40%  (Lazard, 2012) 
CRF 5.83%  calculated 
r 5%  given 
T 40  (Lazard, 2012) 
Plant capacity 100 MW  Assumption 
O&M costs Value(s)  Source 
Fixed O&M 80 USD2012/kW-y 656 (Lazard, 2012) 
Variable O&M 3.00 USD2012/MWh 24.60 (Lazard, 2012) 
e 2.5%  (Timilsina et al., 2012) 
Economic parameters    
2007 exchange rate ZAR/USD 7.10  (World Bank, 2013) 
2012 exchange rate ZAR/USD 8.20  (World Bank, 2013) 
2008 PPI 14.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2009 PPI -0.1%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2010 PPI 6.0%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2011 PPI 8.4%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2012 PPI 6.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
Externalities    
Emission intensity in g CO2-eq./KWh 38.00  (Burkhardt et al., 2012) 
Health externalities in ZARcent2009/KWh 0.09 1.10 (Edkins et al., 2010c) 
Externalities Scenarios low median  high   
Global damage cost in ZAR2010/t CO2-eq.  5.83 109.80 177.79  (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 6.71 126.40 204.67  calculated 
External cost from GHG emissions in 
ZAR2012/MWh 
0.26 4.80 7.78  calculated 
Total externalities ZAR2012/MWh 11.26 15.80 18.78  calculated 
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Appendix 7: Input parameters for PV plants, rural utility scale (RUS) and residential roof-top (RRT) 
 Capital costs Value(s) Conversion 
to ZAR2012 
Source 
cpRUS 2375 USD2012/kW;                19475 (Lazard, 2012) 
cpRRT 3250 USD2012/kW 26650 (Lazard, 2012) 
H 8760  given 
fRUS 27%  calculated 
fRRT 22%  (Lazard, 2012) 
CRF 8.02%  calculated 
r 5%  given 
T 20  (Lazard, 2012) 
Plant capacity 10 MW  Assumption 
Average annual solar irradiation in Upington 2796 KWh/m²  (Suri, 2011) 
Dimensions Solaire SDT1000 - 100W 1190 x 670 x 35 mm  (Sustainable.co.za, 2013) 
Area needed for 1 KWp 7.79m²  calculated 
Performance ratio solar panel 0.75  (Hult et al., 2005) 
Module efficiency 16%  (Darling et al., 2011) 
Degradation rate module per year 0.6%  (Darling et al., 2011) 
Average electricity production per KWp  2570 KWh  calculated 
Plant capacity 10 MW  Assumption 
O&M costs Value(s)  Source 
Fixed O&M 500 ZAR2011 /kWp-y 531 (SAPVIA, 2011) 
e 2.5%  (Timilsina et al., 2012) 
Economic parameters    
2012 exchange rate ZAR/USD 8.20  (World Bank, 2013) 
2010 PPI 6.0%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2011 PPI 8.4%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2012 PPI 6.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
Externalities    
Health externalities in ZARcent2009/KWh 0.19  (Edkins et al., 2010c) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 2.32  calculated 
Externalities Scenarios low median  high   
Emission intensity in g CO2-eq./KWh 23.00 33.50 44.00  (Peng et al., 2013) 
Global damage cost in ZAR2010/t CO2-eq.  5.83 109.80 177.79  (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 6.71 126.40 204.67  calculated 
External cost from GHG emissions in 
ZAR2012/MWh 
0.15 4.23 9.01  calculated 
Total externalities ZAR2012/MWh 1.13    calculated 
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Appendix 8: Input parameters for onshore wind power plant 
Capital costs Value(s) 
Conversion to 
ZAR2012 
Source 
cp 1857 USD2012/kW 15227  (Lantz et al., 2012) 
H 8760  given 
f 35%  (Ayodele et al., 2012) 
CRF 8.02%  calculated 
r 5%  given 
T 20  (Lazard, 2012) 
Plant capacity 3 MW  (Lantz et al., 2012) 
Hub height 80m  (Lantz et al., 2012) 
Rotor diameter 112m  (Lantz et al., 2012) 
O&M costs Value(s)  Source 
Variable O&M 16 USD2012/MWh 131.20 (Lantz et al., 2012) 
e 0%  (Lantz et al., 2012) 
Economic parameters    
2012 exchange rate ZAR/USD 8.20  (World Bank, 2013) 
2010 PPI 6.0%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2011 PPI 8.4%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
2012 PPI 6.2%  (StatsSA, 2012b) 
Externalities    
Health externalities in ZARcent2009/KWh 0.09 
 (Edkins et al., 2010c) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 1.10  calculated 
Externalities Scenarios low median  high   
Emission intensity in g CO2-eq./KWh 4.97 6.99 9.00  
(Wang and Sun, 2012, 
Guezuraga et al., 2012) 
Global damage cost in ZAR2010/t CO2-eq.  5.83 109.80 177.79  (Blignaut et al., 2011) 
Conversion to ZAR2012/MWh 6.71 126.40 204.67  calculated 
Total externalities ZAR2012/MWh 1.13 1.98 2.94  calculated 
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